Editor's note: This is the fourth in a series of articles presented by The Journal to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Antietam Campaign.
HARPERS FERRY - Garrisoned troops during the Civil War had it a lot better than their comrades-in-arms who were stationed in the field, repeatedly on the move, marching into battle.
For one thing, garrisoned troops got to eat regularly and got much better food, explained Scott Bevers, a park ranger at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park.
Journal photo by John McVey
Members of the Harpers Ferry National Historical Park’s Youth Conservation Corps, portraying Union soldiers garrisoned at Harpers Ferry in 1862, drill on a 12-pound Napoleon cannon atop Bolivar Heights as part of the park’s activities leading up to the 150th anniversary of Battle of Harpers Ferry, which was fought during the Civil War’s Antietam Campaign.
"Garrisoned troops got better rations because they were on major supply lines," he said. "Troops in the field never knew what they would get."
On a unusually rainy Saturday morning in late July, he was preparing salted beef for an encampment and cannon demonstration on Bolivar Heights as part of the park's activities leading up the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Harpers Ferry Sept. 12-15, 1862.
The battle was part of the Civil War's Antietam Campaign.
Alyssa Fisher, an intern working at the park, was preparing rolls for a Dutch oven and members of the park's Youth Conservation Corps, portraying Union soldiers, drilled on a 12-pound Napoleon cannon and huddled under a canopy out of the drizzle.
The young reenactors represented soldiers of the Union garrison stationed at Harpers Ferry during the Antietam Campaign, many of whom probably were not too much older than the YCC members.
And many of the Union units were green, having been mustered into the army only a month earlier.
Whatever enjoyment they might have had having been assigned to Harpers Ferry came to an abrupt end Sept. 12.
That is when Confederate Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's vanguard arrived at the foot of Maryland Heights across the Potomac River. Maryland Heights dominated the small but strategically important town at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers.
At about the same time, another column of Confederate soldiers stopped on the eastern slope of Loudoun Heights on the other side of the Shenandoah River from Harpers Ferry.
Finally, on Sept. 13, Jackson, at the head of about 15,000 men, appeared on School House Ridge south of town. The 14,000 Federal troops in Harpers Ferry were surrounded and completely cut off.
Gen. Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, had crossed the Potomac at White's Ford on Sept. 4. He entered Maryland to take the fight to the North.
Lee took his about 40,000-man army to Frederick, Md., and waited for four days. He was waiting for the Union forces in Martinsburg - about 3,000 strong - and Harpers Ferry to leave.
Actually, Lee was counting on them withdrawing. Their retreat was key to his invasion plans.
Lee's invasion interposed his army between the garrisons at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg and Washington, Dennis Frye, chief historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park, said in a recent interview.
"They (the Federals) were completely cut off from all communications and reinforcements," he said. "Lee expects Union forces to withdraw from the (Shenandoah) Valley and head north. But the Yankees didn't move. They were ordered to remain steadfast in their positions by Washington."
This caused a serious problem for Lee, Frye said.
"There are 14,000 men in his rear who can intercept and interrupt his supply and communication lines through the Shenandoah Valley," he said. "Something had to be done."
On Sept. 9, Lee issued Special Orders 191, sending two-thirds of his army to eliminate the threat at Harpers Ferry and the rest to Hagerstown.
Jackson was in charge of the about 25,000 troops headed for Harpers Ferry. One column, under Gen. Lafayette McLaws, was to take Maryland Heights. Another column commanded by John G. Walker was to take Loudoun Heights.
And Jackson, at the head of about 15,000, was to clear Martinsburg of Union troops, opening the Valley Pike, and then move onto Harpers Ferry from the south.
Outnumbered by about five to one, the Federal units at Martinsburg fled to Harpers Ferry upon Jackson's approach Sept. 10. The first part of the plan was accomplished. The Valley Pike was cleared.
However, Jackson lingered in Martinsburg for a full day Sept. 11 and did not get to Harpers Ferry until late in the morning Sept. 13. He was at least a day behind schedule.
McLaws sent two brigades up Maryland Heights to force the Federal troops from the mountain. It took those two brigades about nine hours to dislodge the outnumbered Union forces, but they finally retreated to Harpers Ferry.
Walker found no resistance on Loudoun Heights and occupied the crest Sept. 13.
Jackson took up his position on School House Ridge across from Bolivar Heights where the Union forces were dug in.
None of his forces could easily launch an assault on the Union forces, so Jackson began a siege of the town and garrison. He bombarded the Federals from three sides.
But Col. Dixon Miles, commander of the Union garrison, would not give in. He stood his ground.
The cannon bombardment continued through the day Sept. 14.
Jackson decided he would have to attack the Union lines on the ground, so he sent Gen. A.P. Hill with about 5,000 men dragging 20 cannons around the Union's flank on a harrowing night maneuver along the Shenandoah River.
With great effort, Hill got around the Federals entrenched on the Chambers Farm at the far eastern end of Bolivar Heights without being detected.
When the sun came up Sept. 15, the area was cloaked in dense fog -and silence.
The fog finally burned off at about 10 a.m. and the Union troops discovered Hill's Confederates behind them.
Dixon held a council of war with his officers and they decided surrender was their only choice.
While riding along the front lines, telling his men to raise the white flag, a shell exploded behind him. He was mortally wounded and died the next day.
Meanwhile, about six miles north of Harpers Ferry in Pleasant Valley, Md., sat Union Gen. William B. Franklin, commanding the VI Corps of the U.S. Army of the Potomac, some 12,800 soldiers.
The day before, Sept. 14, Franklin had been ordered by U.S. Gen. George B. McClellan to drive across South Mountain at Crampton's Gap, turn south and relieve Dixon at Harpers Ferry.
Although he outnumbered the Confederates defending Crampton's Gap by more than six to one, he waited three hours to attack. It took another three hours to push the Confederates off the mountain.
By then it was about 6 p.m., night was falling and Franklin stopped.
When he heard no cannon fire coming from Harpers Ferry the next day, Franklin figured the Union garrison there had fallen, which it had, and Franklin asked to withdraw.
More than 12,500 Union soldiers surrendered at Harpers Ferry, the largest surrender of U.S. Army forces until the fall of Bataan in World War II.
Although it took longer for Jackson to subdue Harpers Ferry than Lee had planned, Jackson was able to rejoin Lee's forces Sept. 16.
Lee was waiting for Jackson along Antietam Creek at Sharpsburg, Md.
Also Sept. 16, the advance units of McClellan's 75,000 soldiers began arriving at Sharpsburg, setting the stage for the bloodiest single-day battle in American history.
- Staff writer John McVey can be reached at 304-263-3381, ext. 128, or email@example.com.