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Steve Heath Rev. James Carter, S.J. Faith, Science, and Religion 4 May 2008 Understanding Free Will Is there such a thing as free will? This question has been debated, in some form or another, for centuries. In his dispute with the Manicheans and Semipelageians, St. Augustine asserted that free will coexisted with God¶s omnipotent and omniscient nature through the act of grace. During the Reformation, thinkers like John Calvin and Martin Luther championed the concepts of predestination relegating all humanity to slavery of a predetermined fate and leaving little if any room for free will. Modern philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and David Hume grappled with reconciling free will with deterministic implications of empiricism. Newtonian physics would soon transform and somewhat solidify a determinist stand on debate for centuries, that is, until twentieth century developments in the fields of quantum physics opened, or reopened, further possibilities for the issue. Although new philosophic and scientific developments arose, and continue to arise, to support and challenge arguments over free will, similarities arise over definition of terms, contextual frameworks and relations between the two. In this paper I address modern developments in physics and neurobiology, the implicative consequences on free will that followed such developments, and my own conclusions and personal interpretations. To compensate for a lack of thorough comprehension on modern physics, I have relied upon the writings of the physicist, Paul Davies, and the physicist/theologian John Polkinghorne for formulating a general understanding of the concepts of chaos theory and quantum mechanics. Discussion on the neurological experiments of
Benjamin Libet will be supplemented by peer-reviewed journal articles from researchers analyzing his work, and from those that have conducted similar experiments on readiness potential. Finally, I must disclose that the conclusion I have settled upon is entirely taken from an explanation ± or more so, a reconciliation ± of free will and determinism as presented in the article On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An essay in bridging Neuroscience and Faith by Palmyre M.F. Oomen. After struggling to find an explanation I could settle upon, I was lucky to come across Oomen¶s essay which helped bridge my compatibilist leanings and personal theological beliefs. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEWTON Before the sixteenth century, the world was understood in terms of ³magic numbers.´ From the sixth century B.C. onwards Euclidean geometry led members of the Pythagorean School to uncover remarkable geometric relationships within nature ± lending useful application to the studies of architecture and navigation. As numerical patterns emerged out of nature and even music, numbers were held in a more mystical and meaningful regard ± God became a great manipulator of geometric shapes. This ability to mete out and make sense of the physical world would inspire new philosophic developments like Plato¶s Theory of Forms. (Davies 1992, 93-96) Overall, the uncovering of mathematics in nature brought the search for truth into the arena of this world from the heavens where it was once relegated. Newtonian mechanics caused a revolutionary shift, not only in the way numbers were looked upon, but also in the philosophical conceptions of how the universe and its creator operate. Galileo¶s law of falling bodies added the new dimension of time to Euclidean geometry and would inspire Isaac Newton¶s revolutionary Calculus. Davies explains the great impact this development would make over the next two centuries:
The central feature of [Calculus] is the notion of continuous change. Newton made this the basis of his theory of mechanics, in which the laws of motion and material bodies were set down. The most striking and successful application of Newton¶s mechanics was to the motion of the planets in the solar system. Thus the music of spheres was replaced by the image of the clockwork universe. This image achieved its most developed form with the work of Pierre Laplace in the late eighteenth century, who envisaged every atom in the universe as a component in an unfailingly precise cosmic clockwork mechanism. God the Geometer became God the Watchmaker. (Davies 1992, 97) Laplace extended Newtonian physics largely into astronomy where he theorized the concept of gravitational collapse; however, as far as this paper is concerned, his greatest contribution was the ³Laplacian Demon´ which reinforced beliefs in causal determinism. This hypothetical construct theorized ³if a being knew at one instant the positions and motions of every particle in the universe he would have at his disposal all the information necessary to compute the entire past and future history of the universe´ (Davies 1982, 136). The significance of this construct on free will, relates to the consequential reality that all events, including human choices, are predetermined by the causal events that preceded them. Was this idea that grew out of Newtonian physics the nail in the coffin for free will? Those who agreed with Laplace¶s construct and denied the possibility of recognizing free will along such constructs would be labeled hard determinists, or incompatibilists; those who believed free will could be reconciled with determinism were soft determinists, or compatibilists. A third category that disputed the Laplacian determinism would gain prominence in the early twentieth century. FIGHTING THE LAPLACIAN DEMON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Donald M. Mackay challenged Laplace¶s Demon on the grounds that: if the all events were known in a deterministic setting, one would be able to alter his decision to act in accordance with a causally determined prediction ± or, knowledge of the future allows one to act otherwise and contradict the rules of strict causal determinism. John Polkinghorne acknowledges that holes exist in this argument; however, certain aspects of MacKay¶s debate ± which he has defended in his book The Clock Work Image ± may be employed to explain recent developments in modern physics and the ensuing consequences for free will (Polkinghorne 1991, 42-43). Ian G. Barbour, an expert on the relationship between religion and science, describes Chaos Theory as ³the study of holistic temporal and geometric patterns without reduction to detailed causal mechanisms (Barbour 1999, 382). In Quarks, Chaos and Christianity, Polkinghorne said systems studied under the theory contain interactions occurring so frequently that two types of causality emerge: the ³bottom-up causes´ are reduced to the localized interactions of the individual parts, while the ³top-down causes´ define the actions of the system as a whole, and may be referred to as ³pattern information.´ Top-down causes can also be defined as ³the influence of a system on its subsystems [where] higher-level events impose boundary conditions on chemical and physical processes at lower levels without violating lowerlevel laws´ (Barbour 1999, 383). Due to the incalculable amount of interactions, or ³exquisite sensitivity,´ within the system, it is almost pointless to take the reductionist approach and only account for bottom-up causes. (Polkinghorne 1994, 65-71) The sensitivity of chaotic systems means that they can never be isolated from what goes on around them. This implies that they can only be properly discussed holistically, that is to say in terms if all that is going on [top-down causes], not just in terms of localized bits and pieces [bottom-up causes]. The way they react to small nudges corresponds not to a
change in energy (for the nudges can be vanishingly small), but to a change in the pattern of behavior within the confines of possibility represented by the µstrange attractor.¶ (Polkinghorne 1994, 68-69) Now, in relating all of this to Laplace¶s demon, we see that the very concept of knowing all interactions in a given system would be nearly impossible to calculate, and given the ³exquisite sensitivity´ it would not be fruitful to attempt to reduce all future events to the conditions of bottom-up causes (73). Davies furthers the argument against reductionism by pointing out that our universe ³should have an expanding horizon in space´ allowing for unaccounted disturbances to any ultrasensitive system (Davies 1984, 137). Polkinghorne goes on to say that top-down causes may also help understand the mental/physical separations of the mind and brain: I do not for one moment claim that the mystery of mind and brain is near to a solution, but one major attraction of the µguess¶ I have been suggesting is that it begins to describe a physical world that we can conceive ourselves as inhabiting. The way we act in our bodies seems to have this holistic, top-down, character to it. (Polkinghorne 1994, 71) This concept of discriminating between top-down and bottom-up causes ± and Polkinghorne¶s proposal of labeling top-down causes as communication of information (Polkinghorne 1994, 69) ± will be addressed later in this paper to understand the concept supervenience and its implication on the identification of self. Chaos theory raises some serious challenges to Laplacian Determinism; however, it can be argued that the theory still has strong roots in determinism. Note: Polkinghorne and others have suggested that the indeterminacy of ultrasensitive systems may suggest a relationship with Heisenburg¶s Uncertainty Principle, but this is still a matter of debate (Polkinghorne 1994, 70).
Before moving on to the next section I will address Davies¶ three possible understandings of freedom allowed by the determinist perspective: The first suggests human freedom would exist under the circumstance that if all causes preceding a decision were replicated exactly, and there is a possibility that an agent could still choose otherwise. This represents the views of the incompatibilist, and requires a degree of faith since it is impossible to test. The second definition harkens back to Mackay¶s argument that it would be impossible to know all circumstances; therefore, freedom is unpredictable to the agent (Largely supported by the implications of Chaos Theory). This view allows free will¶s compatibility with determinism, and is also shared by the philosopher A.J. Ayer who, in his essay ³Freedom and Necessity,´ argues that free will should be defined not by causality, but by lack of constraint. The third view is the dualist approach which recognizes determinism while maintaining that the mind freely acts without the constraint of the laws of Newton because it inhabits its own realm distinctive from the physical universe. There are many arguments and interpretations of this third view regarding the manner of interaction between the mental and physical realms. (Davies 1984, 139) THE INDETERMINACY OF QUANTUM PHYSICS Before the twentieth century it was held that all workings of nature were governed by the laws of Newtonian Mechanics. However, when observations at the subatomic level could not be determined through the classical physics, a new field supported by probabilities and contradictions emerged to challenge the deterministic laws of nature, Quantum Mechanics. To quote Polkinghorne, what was ³classically nonsensical is quantum mechanically perfectly intelligible. (Polkinghorne 1991, 87)´ The Uncertainty Principle, a theory central to quantum mechanics developed by Werner Heisenberg, stated that a particle¶s location and momentum could not be simultaneously
predicted. Rather, as a particle¶s momentum was more accurately predicted the location became more obscure, and vice versa. ³Heisenberg¶s famous uncertainty principle assures us that there is always an irreducible indeterminism in the operation of subatomic particles (Davies 1984, 137).´ This indeterminacy at the subatomic level completely throws off the exclusive bottom-up approach of Newtonian Mechanics as the inability to predict the motion of a particle puts a kink in the concept of causal determinism ± especially taken in the context of predicting ultrasensitive systems. The assumed predictability of the natural world was now subject to the contradictory laws of its own building blocks. Quantum Theory opens the door to an undetermined future, but does this hinge upon human freedom? If uncertainty lies at the roots of all natural laws, then the proponents of free will have much to answer. Firstly, does uncertainty equate free will at all? If root causes can be reduced to random chance, like the firing of an electron, so can the foundations of human decision-making. The cage imposed by causal determinism now exists in a world subjected to the rules of randomness. How can one take ownership for his own action if those actions are not caused but subject to a subatomic dice roll? This question calls forth the important issue of responsibility which from an indeterminist perspective has no meaning. If all choices arise from randomly-generated root causes then how can one be held responsible? This brings up serious moral issues relating punishment and justice. (Davies 1984) Proponents of free will coinciding with quantum indeterminism propose a dualistic solution to fill in the gaps. They claim that uncertainty, lying at the root of all causes, is determined by an otherworldly human will, or divine intervention, not subject to the laws of nature (Sansbury 120). In an essay from Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science Carl Helrich explained such rationale and its inherent roadblocks:
The role of human consciousness in the quantum theory has been of interest at various times. Von Neumann ( 1955) introduced a theory of quantum measurement that involves the human brain in the last step. He assumed that the only physics was quantum physics and that, therefore, the interaction with a measuring apparatus was itself also quantum. The idea went together well if one considered only an ideal situation, but difficulties arose for realistic conditions and resulted in the propagation of quantum interferences (entanglements) to a macroscopic level. The resolution was to terminate the measuring process with an observer having consciousness. The individual¶s consciousness was claimed to be a unity, which was not subject to the multiplicities of the quantum theory (Omnès 1999). The problem with this solution is that it uses unresolved aspects of human consciousness to resolve difficulties in physical theory. Although it is a rapidly progressing area of research (in which I am personally involved), our present understanding of the details of the biophysics of neural transmission is still incomplete. And, as with any research program, we do not know how far we are from complete understanding or even if that can ever be attained. (Helrich 559-558) The quantum indeterminists who favor free will have encountered conflict justifying their cases with recent scientific developments. In 2006 Gerard µt Hooft of Utrecht University of the Netherlands introduced a theory that confirmed Einstein¶s belief that even smaller scales of matter influenced the seemingly uncertain nature of subatomic particles ± thus, establishing a deterministic root to quantum behavior (Zeeya). A month after µt Hooft presented his findings, two Princeton University professors, John Conway and Simon Kochen, interpreted his conclusions as a zero-sum chance for human freedom. Resting the entire possibility of free will
on the conclusiveness of µt Hooft¶s work, Kochen said, "our lives could be like the second showing of a movie ² all actions play out as though they are free, but that freedom is an illusion." (Zeeya) Conway and Kochen defend the case for free will by countering quantum determinists with their Free Will Theorem: Our Free Will Theorem is the latest in a line of argument against such theories. However, the situation is not as simple as it seems, since the determinacy of such theories can be conjured out of existence by a simple semantic trick«Bohm¶s theory so exorcised, has become a non-deterministic theory, which, however, still gives exactly the same predictions! In fact, the exorcised form of Bohm¶s theory is consistent with our assertion that particles have free will. We need only suppose once again that a Janus uses appropriate truly random devices to give the probability distributions Pt. If he does so, then the responses of the particles in our spin experiments, for instance, will not be determined ahead of time, and so they will be exhibiting free will, in our sense. (Conway and Kochen 1454) But should free will be grounded on the indeterminacy of quantum theory or is there a light at the end of the tunnel for a compatibilist approach? Neurological studies made possible with the electroencephalograph have created yet another stage for this debate. LIBET¶S EXPERIMENTS So far, this discussion has focused on philosophical implications derived from research in the physical sciences. Free will, as reconciled by both determinists and indeterminists philosophies, has straddled upon the very certainty of subatomic particles. Now the debate shifts focus to the biological workings of the human brain. Use of the electroencephalograph to
measure electric activity in the brain allows research to reduce human actions to the very neurons that generate them. These studies, replicated with varying results, have generated a whole new dialogue over the timing and origin of the human decision. In the 1930¶s scientists began measuring electrical impulses to identify parts of the brain responsible for basic human functions. In 1963 the University of Ulm¶s Hans Kornhuber and Luder Deecke conducted timing experiments measuring the correspondence between neural activity and the performance of simple movements. Their experiments yielded shocking results: the observed brain activity preceded the action by approximately 500 milliseconds. The scientists labeled this period of preparatory activity the Bereitschaftspotential, or Readiness Potential. In the 1980¶s Benjamin Libet of the University of California, San Francisco would test the correspondence between the Readiness Potential of an action and the conscious decision of the participant to act (Libet et al. 1983). The findings of these tests have been repeated successfully although the analyses remain disputed. (Libet 34) Monitored by an electroencephalograph, participants in Libet¶s experiments were told to perform a simple task (like raising a finger) while observing the circular motion of a dot on a screen ± they were free to act whenever they wanted. After acting the patients were instructed to identify the location of the dot at the exact instant they decided to act. Remarkably, Libet found that the participants decided to move 350 milliseconds after the Readiness Potential began (as determined by the EEG readings). This suggested that the patients¶ brains had begun processing for the action 350 milliseconds before the conscious decision to act (Libet et al. 1983). ³This struck a blow to the traditional notion of free will, for how can our wills be free if we are only belatedly aware of their decisions? (Libet 1989, 35) ´ The second conclusion of Libet¶s test helped answer this.
Libet also found that the participants underwent a series of attempts to act before the final execution. EEG readings showed series of Readiness Potential curves that dropped in voltage around the last 150 milliseconds before the final, stronger curve that induced the action. This and the patients¶ testimonies of contemplating acting numerous times before doing so, led Libet to hypothesize that the brain is allowed a 150 millisecond interval of time to veto an action in the neurological process. He noted that if free will existed it was in this ability to veto action: We may not be aware of all the movements for which our minds may be readying us, but we can elect, decisively, not to flick a finger or pick up a gun. Alternatively, it may be that a conscious trigger is required before any act is executed and that and readiness potential not given the go-ahead withers on the vine. Either way, the foundation of free will seems to reside not within our unconscious capacity for generating choices but within our conscious ability, in the hundred and fifty milliseconds before taking action, to make up our minds. (Libet 36) For the compatibilist, Libet¶s findings present an obstacle for free will. In a dissection and critique of Libet¶s experiments, John M. Ostrowick points out the exact conflict: When we talk of ³an agent getting what she wants´, the question is whether we are talking about the causal efficacy of the RP, or the causal efficacy of the mental state qua mental, or both (assuming that ³wants´ are mental and efficacious qua mental). If the mental is not efficacious ± and this seems to be Libet's concern ± then the wants and desires would not be efficacious. Hence, we would say that the agent gets what she wants because of a non-conscious RP, which is not the same as having free choice on the compatibilist model. In other words, even if the compatibilist construal of free-will is
correct, Libet's results seem to show that agents do not have free-will of the sort that compatibilists describe. (Ostrowick 277) He criticized Libet for his equation of free will with the µability to veto¶ found in the last 150 milliseconds before an action. According to Ostrowick, Libet¶s idea of free will only exists in situations where one changes his mind ± by asserting a veto after the readiness potential and its subsequent point of volition (Ostrowick 281). Libet acknowledged this interpretation of free will: [The Studies] produced evidence that the brain appears to initiate a freely voluntary act well before the subject is aware that he/she wishes or feels the urge to act. The recorded readiness potential (RP) precedes by 350 ms the subject¶s report of being conscious of the wish (W) to act. However, W precedes the act by 150±200 ms, so there is time for the conscious function to control the final outcome; it can stop or veto the process so that no act occurs. (Libet 1985) However, Ostrowick finds it unreasonable for Libet to not conclude a preceding neural activity for the veto ± which is viewed as a conscious event like the point of volition (preceded by the Readiness Potential) (279). Ostrowick concludes that measuring the point of volition served only to allow for the construction for a potential for veto. Both stages, he argues, have no true value to the decision, governed entirely by the readiness potential, and are therefore epiphenomenal within the process (282). We know that we can control ourselves in some sense, and veto our decisions. But I believe that what we decide and what we veto (if Libet's interpretation stands) is a nonconscious result of our non-conscious self-structures (see e.g. Dennett, 1993:199 et seq.). Hence, I believe that Libet's results are strong evidence against free-will. (Ostrowick 285)
The central argument around these tests lie in whether our decisions result from a conscious present decision or a subconscious decision formed from past events ± Sigmund Freud would argue the latter. Ostrowick has closed Libet¶s window for free will on the grounds of determinism (because actions do not stem from the agent¶s present µwants¶ but rather from the causal chain of subconscious neural activity) and indeterminism (because volition has no role in the non-vetoed act, hence it is epiphenomenal, or a meaningless byproduct.) Libet, who has since accepted an indeterminist possibility involving Field Theorem, defended his position that the Veto, as a conscious mental action, does not necessitate pre-neural activity (Libet 1999). In the light of neurological experimentation arguments of free will have centered on the search for causal neurological chains to promote a determinist conclusion against free will. From this perspective any theories in favor of free will must solicit indeterminist links in the chain of neuronal behavior ± as Libet suggests with his µveto.¶ But why should determinism spell the doom for free will? The working definition we have assumed for free will is the ability to have chosen otherwise. This definition presents many obstacles for the determinist who views uncertainty as merely a lack of knowledge of prior circumstances. Perhaps, we should alter the discussion to understand free will under different definitions. AYER¶S FREE WILL AND NECESSITY To conform to the causal laws of nature the twentieth century British philosopher A.J. Ayer proposed a new compatibilist definition for free will. ³It seems that if we are to retain this idea of moral responsibility, we must either show that men can be held responsible for actions which they do not do freely, or else find some way of reconciling determinism with the freedom of will. (Ayer 114)´ For Ayer, this task required defining free will, by not what it is, but by what
it is not. Those who deny the existence of free will in the light of determinism would define free will as the contrast of causality, for how could an entirely free choice be made if it results from prior causes. But, perhaps this conclusion is the consequence of a metaphorical misunderstanding or causality: We tend to form an imaginative picture of an unhappy effect trying vainly to escape from the clutches of an overmastering cause. But, I repeat, the fact is simply that when an even of one type occurs, an event of another type occurs also, in a certain temporal or spatiotemporal relation to the first. The rest is only metaphor, and not because of the fact, that we come to think there is an antithesis between causality and freedom. (Ayer 118) Instead of causality Ayer prescribes constraint as free will¶s necessary contrast. ³All causes equally necessitate,´ but this does not mean that ³all causes constrain´ (116). A difference exists between the scenarios that a man crosses the room to get a book and a man who crosses the room because he is held at gun point. Only to the latter may it be said that the agent acted out of constraint and, therefore, against his free will (Ayer 115-116). For the first scenario getting the book may have caused the man to move; however, obtaining the book did not constrain him: ³There is an invariable concomitance between the two classes of events; but there is no compulsion, in any but a metaphorical sense. (117)´ Just because behavior may be explained, it does not hold that it was not freely acted: To say that I could have acted otherwise is to say, first, that I should have acted otherwise if I had so chosen; second, that my action was voluntary in the sense in which the actions, say, of the kleptomaniac are not; and thirdly, that nobody compelled me to choose as I did: and these three conditions may very well be fulfilled. (Ayer 117)
Under this logic, Laplace¶s demon does not threaten free will at all. Predicting future events in a determinist setting requires the calculation of human actions, dismissing the fatalist case for their inconsequentiality. Furthermore: What it does entail is that my behavior can be predicted: but to say that my behavior can be predicted is not to say that I am acting under constraint. It is indeed true that I cannot escape my destiny if this is taken to mean no more than that I shall do what I shall do. But this is a tautology, just as it is a tautology that what is going to happen is going to happen. And such tautologies as these prove nothing whatsoever about the freedom of the will. (Ayer 118) Ayer offered a softer view of a perceivably harsh deterministic world. As an atheist, he did not offer any theological terminologies or positions in his essay. He even hints that obedience to a supreme being would constitute a constrained action since ³I have acquired a strong habit of obedience that I no longer go through any process of deciding whether or not to do what the other person (or being) wants.´ The next focus of the discussion bears strong theological ties. Similar to Ayer¶s proposal it requires a sort of redefining and re-conceptualizing of terms. It also attempts to reconcile free will within a determinist setting ± specifically that brought about by neurological breakthroughs. PARELLELS IN THOMISM AND NEUROSCIENCE The discussion for free will takes on a dismal setting in the light of the neurological studies of the twentieth century. Libet¶s own rationalizing for a type of µveto-action¶ freedom stands on shaky grounds as others have argued for its invalidity or further roots in subconscious determinism. But Palmyre M.F. Oomen, the Director of Theology and Science at the University of Nijmegen, has provided a more hopeful interpretation that bridges the determinist conclusions
of neuroscience with the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Arguing against the idea that free will must require unpredictability, Oomen explored the concepts of self and mind under the contexts of philosophical principles like Supervenience, to equate free will with the idea of selfdetermination . As science has confirmed, the human brain is an extremely complex system of neural activity. Earlier we discussed Polkinghorne¶s approach to viewing ultrasensitive systems with two types of causes: bottom-up and top-down. The same approach must apply to understanding the complex relationship between the brain and mind, and this is facilitated by the concept of Supervenience. The notions of causality through energetic interaction of constituents on the one hand, and of causality through the top-down effect of active information on the other, have about them something of the flavor of the material and the mental in a complementary relationship. There might be here a glimmer of how mind and brain relate to each other. (Polkinghorne 1998, 62) A supervenient property is one that emerges out of the deductive properties within a system. In music, the various tones, or notes, individually have distinctive characteristics, but when they are arranged another property emerges, melody. Just as a melody may stimulate inspiration, supervenient properties can take on causal roles apart from those of the smaller parts in the system. (Oomen 379-380) The mind must be viewed in a similar fashion. The mind is not separate from the neurons (and from all other things involved in the physical contacts among the neurons), but nevertheless the mind has properties that cannot be reduced to them. It has added (supervenient, or emergent) properties. And, because there are plausible reasons to think that some emergent properties play causal
roles within their own domain (as the piece of music does), the fact that the mind requires a material basis does not preclude it per se from playing a causal role within its own domain. So, it is conceivable that ³mind matters.´ (Oomen 380) The supervenient properties of a system may exhibit causes affecting the smaller parts of that system. This is important for understanding Thomas Aquinas¶ view of the soul as the form of the body (Aquinas Q 13, Sec. 1). This supervenient relationship also avoids resorting to dualist or hard determinist perspectives. Aquinas said the soul possesses certain appetites which can be viewed as other emerging properties of the bodily system ± free will is included as one of these (Aquinas Q 78). Self-organization occurs when properties within a system emerge to maintain order and coherence ± a task not accomplished by external or centralized forces ± in adapting to its environment (Oomen 382). Thus, the emerging soul maintains the adaptive nature of the body by acting on its reductive processes. Oomen argues that consciousness forms out of this need for the bodily system to adapt and consequently form a unity within the system. Within this system implicit criterion emerge to govern the functions within the system. In biology this is referred to as an immanent valuation principle within a species as it dictates the most efficient execution of tasks. ³That is to say, something is involved that indicates a development in one direction as more attractive than a development in a different direction, so that the one is felt as more beneficial than the other. (Oomen 384)´ Aquinas would refer to this as aspiring for the good (Aquinas Q 13). From here Oomen presents his definition for the soul, self-determination. ³Apparently, one of the essential characteristics of freedom is that it has to do with remaining loyal to the things one considers to be good. (Oomen 385)´ To him, freedom is not dictated by whether an
agent could act otherwise, but rather it is defined by the agent¶s ability to choose the same selfdetermined option if allowed to choose again. This determinist assertion claims that uncertainty undermines human freedom which is governed by the supervenient property to do what best benefits the agent (as far as he can perceive). Here, freedom means that I am free if I am not forced to refrain from what I consider good, if I am not tempted or forced to betray my deepest convictions (myself), if I am not alienated. In this sense, freedom means an unthwarted orientation of the will on that which is thought of as good. (Oomen 386) This definition aligns freedom with commitment. Although this may seem paradoxical, consider the following example: If I am concerned about my weight I will choose to eat a healthy meal over one rich in calories. To say that freedom equals indeterminism would suggest that in order to be free I would, in the exact circumstances, might just as well choose to eat the unhealthy meal. This could easily happen; however, Oomen claims that in the second scenario I would not be acting freely because choosing the unhealthy meal would be contradicting the rules I have set up for myself ± in fact, I would be enslaved to the allure of the unhealthy meal. But what is the good? The good can be compared to the ³strange attractor´ mentioned by Polkinghorne. The good has a top-down effect on the entire system inducing the will, as information, to act as a valuation system for the entire body. ³You are attracted by it; you want it. It forms your will. It is therefore an attraction that does not compete with your self, does not alienate you from your self, but in fact constitutes you as a subject, as a self. (Oomen 386)´ MY CONCLUSION I must say that I align with Oomen on the discussion of the human will. Before embarking on this project I cannot say that I even had an opinion on whether or not free will
exists. I have thought about it and have even read some materials in philosophy classes; however, the entire question baffled me to the extent that I could not form a coherent answer for myself. The question of free will has led me through the physical and neurological sciences in search of a reconciliation with determinism. Quantum physics and the neurological studies of Benjamin Libet all proposed different answers; however, it seems that they were never asking the right question: Could free will be uni-directional as it inspires for a single goal? I only arrived at my answer through the theological teachings of Aquinas. As for indeterminism, I cannot imagine freedom existing as a random throw of the dice. It appears some believe that this is the only option for it, although I must counter that the definitions for freedom given by A.J. Ayer and Palmyre Oomen give more hope and meaning to free will ± whether or not it is defined as the contrast to constraint or simply as selfdetermination. Whether or not indeterminism even exists at the quantum level, I cannot say for I am not in expert in that field. However, I have no qualms over siding with Einstein and Bohm who believed that even the uncertainty of subatomic parts could be determined through the knowledge of hidden variables. I believe the most beneficial piece of knowledge I have gained from this process has been in Oomen¶s definition of freedom as self-determination. I have heard this from others, but not in the way he described it. In application to everyday life, it is easy to act unjustly and excessively under the false auspices of µfreedom¶; however, this is not true freedom. My freedom is only exercised when I am able to act justly for the ultimate good without being constrained by everyday temptation. Today¶s apathetic and lazy society, myself included, could greatly benefit from this perception. Our government could greatly benefit from this perception! Living in vice without
care for our fellow brethren is not living freely ± in fact, it constrains the very soul that emerges out of the entire human system. As this system is an ultrasensitive system in itself, every human agent is responsible for maintaining that his actions align with the values of humanity. This very profound interpretation has helped me to better understand the magnitude and beauty of Christ¶s message through Resurrection.
Works Cited Ayer, A.J. ³Freedom and Necessity.´ Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. 110-118. Barbour, Ian G. ³Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion. 34. 3 (1999): 361398. Barbour, Ian G. When Science Meets Religion. New York: HarperCollins, 2000. Conway, John and Simon Kochen. ³The Free Will Theorem.´ Foundations of Physics. 36.10 (2006):1441-1473. Davies, Paul. 1992. The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World. New York: Simon & Schuster. Davies, Paul. 1984. God and the New Physics. New York: Simon & Schuster. Helrich, Carl S. ³On the Limitations and Promise of Quantum Theory for Comprehension of Human Knowledge and Consciousness.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion. 41.3 (2006): 543-565. Libet, Benjamin. ³Neural Destiny.´ Sciences. 29.2 (1989): 32-36. Libet, Benjamin, C.A. Gleason, E.W. Wright and D.K. Pearl. ³Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities (readiness-potential); the unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.´ Brain. 106 (1983): 623±642. Libet, Benjamin. ³Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.´ Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 8(1985): 529±566. Libet, Benjamin. ³Do we have free will?´ Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6(1999): 47±57. MacKay, D.M. 1974. The Clock Work Image. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press. Oomen, Palmyre M.F. ³On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An essay in bridging neuroscience and faith.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion. 38.2(2003): 377-392. Polkinghorne, John. 1991. Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology. Philadelphia: Trinity Press International Polkinghorne, John. 1994. Quarks, Chaos and Christianity. Allentown, PA: Triangle Press.
Polkinghorne, John. 1998. Science and Theology: An Introduction. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Sansbury, Timothy. ³The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion. 42.1 (2007): 111-121 Zeeya, Merali. ³Free will ± you only think you have it.´ New Scientist. 190.2550 (2006)
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