There’s been a huge story this week about the legal rights of nonhuman animals held in captivity. On Monday, a New York state court judge issued an order regarding Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held by Stony Brook University in Long Island, New York. The exact legal implications of the order were not entirely clear.
An organization called the Nonhuman Rights Project filed a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo. Habeas is a constitutionally guaranteed right, inherited from English common law allowing a detainee to challenge the cause of their detention or the conditions of their confinement. (A notable example is that Earth Liberation Front political prisoner Eric McDavid was released earlier this year through a habeas petition).
On Monday, April 20, the judge in Hercules and Leo’s case granted a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause. News stories declared it an “historic” move that “recognized chimpanzees as legal persons” and that “chimps were given human rights by U.S. court.”
There was some confusion about the actual legal impact of the order, partly because of the hyperbole and partly because the language around the procedure can be somewhat unclear. “Habeas corpus” literally translates to “you have the body” and is essentially a judge ordering captors to bring the detainee before the court to seek relief. A judge “granting habeas” means ordering that an individual be brought to court to be heard. But a judge “granting habeas” can also mean a judge granting the relief sought through the habeas petition (typically release from detention).
Things got more complicated on Tuesday, when the judge amended the order, striking the part about a habaeas writ and emphasizing that it was just a way for the case to be heard. So my understanding is that the judge granted a hearing on whether Hercules and Leo are being unlawfully detained and ordered the university to appear and to file a brief on the issue.
It is definitely significant that a judge agreed to a hearing. The judge could have simply denied the petition, as judges have previously done. The right of habeas has previously only been applied to humans, so it is noteworthy for a judge order a nonhuman’s claim to be heard. But it is far from what NHRP is seeking: a judicial order ruling that Hercules and Leo are “legal persons” and should be released because they are being unlawfully detained.
There is still the huge legal hurdle of the judge hearing (scheduled for May 27) the case and ruling in favor of Hercules and Leo. (It’s also possible that the judge can decline the hear the case based on the University’s brief).
My prediction is that following the hearing, the judge will rule that Hercules and Leo are not entitled to the relief sought because they are not “persons” under the law, citing a lack of legal precedent in applying “personhood” to nonhuman animals.
I’ll be following the case and making more posts addressing the legal arguments, and analysis on what impact it could have on both nonhuman and human animals. This will be an interesting case to explore issues around liberation, imprisonment and intersectionality.