During this week in the Civil War 150 years ago a key naval engagement, The Battle of Mobile Bay, was fought.
At the very beginning of the war the Union's highest ranking office military officer, Gen. Winfield Scott, had advanced a strategy of cutting off the Confederacy from all naval and commercial access to the inland waterways and ocean ports that surrounded it. He called his strategy the Anaconda Plan, since it was likened to the constricting snake of that name that would slowly tighten its suffocating grip on the Confederacy. At first the plan was scoffed at by most military personnel. The North did not have the resources to enforce the blockade that would be necessary to seal off the South. Indeed, the Southern blockade runners became Confederate heroes for their ability to elude the Northern Navy. Certainly, the fictitious Rhett Butler of "Gone with the Wind" epitomized the dashing blockade runner of The Cause.
But, as time wore on, Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was able to create a Navy that became more formidable and effective with each passing month. By July 4, 1863, Vicksburg, Miss., fell as a result of a collaborative naval and army effort, denying all Confederate access to the Father of Waters. The Confederate armies east of the Mississippi were cut off from essential resources from west of the river, particularly Texas.
By August of 1864 only two ocean ports were still open to Confederate blockade runners (craft typically 75 to 100 feet in length) - Mobile, Ala., and Wilmington, N.C. Admiral David Farragut, the Union's greatest Civil War naval hero, had, since the beginning of 1863, wanted to shut down blockade running into Mobile. But, he found Lincoln and Welles indifferent to any such plan. After Vicksburg fell, Gen. Grant lent mild support to taking Mobile but still nobody in Washington listened. Farragut, however, remained persistent.
Mobile Bay was defended near its entrance by three forts: Morgan, Gaines and Powell, in order of total guns and overall defensive capability. The three forts had 90 total guns. Farragut knew that ships could not take fortresses; only armies on the ground could do that. To neutralize the three forts he would need army forces, none of which he controlled. He also knew that a massive, well-armed (six rifled guns) armor-clad vessel, the CSS Tennessee, was the heart of the small Confederate defensive fleet inside Mobile Bay. His wooden boats would be no match against this Confederate behemoth. He would also need Union armor-clad gunboats, of which he had none, to even the odds against the Tennessee.
In June, Welles ordered the two armor-clad monitors, Manhattan and Tecumseh, to detach from the Atlantic Blockading Fleet and report to Farragut for duty. Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, Farragut's adoptive brother, felt pressure to support and sent two armor-clad gunboats from the Mississippi Squadron, the Chickasaw and the Winnebago, to Mobile Bay.
Next the Army entered the picture. Union General Canby thought that he could supply 5,000 men, a number that would allow the Union infantry to invest both Forts Morgan and Gaines. But on July 8, Canby rescinded the commitment because of a call for more troops by Grant in Virginia. Canby would send 1500 troops under General Granger that would at least neutralize Forts Gaines and Powell in the upcoming battle.
Farragut had hoped to attack on Aug. 4. Granger's troops were in place on the 3rd only 1,500 yards from Ft. Gaines. The only element missing was the monitor Tecumseh, which finally hove into view in the evening. Therefore, the battle was rescheduled for the early morning of the 5th. The Union Navy would consist of four armor-clad monitors and 14 wooden ships. The Confederate Navy, under the command of Admiral Franklin Buchanan, would consist of three wooden gunboats (Selma, Gaines and Morgan) and the formidable, armor-clad CSS Tennessee, which many thought could annihilate all of its Union naval opposition.
Only a few hundred yards west of Ft. Morgan was a line of several dozen torpedoes, which, in our day, are called mines. This line was marked with buoys. It was through this narrow channel, the mines to the left and Ft. Morgan to the right, that the Union squadron must pass, within easy enemy gun range. The plan was to send in the four armor-clad monitors in column first. Then to the left of the monitors in column would come the 14 wooden ships, lashed together to form seven units. If any vessel should be hit and become "dead in the water" its mate would propel it so that it would not create an obstacle or gridlock for following ships. As luck would have it, the wind was blowing into the bay that day, providing extra propulsion for keeping any crippled ship moving in the channel.
The attacking fleet began its assault at 5:45 a.m. Admiral Farragut, who had already demonstrated that he was the master commander at passing land-based fortifications, showed his mettle and expertise again this day. His flagship, the Hartford, was second in the line of wooden ships and was lashed to the Metacomet. Tecumseh opened the shelling at 6:47 a.m. Ft. Morgan returned fire at 7:06 a.m. As the smoke of battle impaired his view of events, Farragut, as was his habit, ascended to to top of the rigging where he could get a better perspective of the battle. A seaman was commanded to tie Farragut to the rigging to prevent a fatal fall.
Soon, the Brooklyn, the first wooden ship in the line, came to a stop, exposing it and the following Hartford to withering fire from Ft. Morgan. Farragut soon realized that the The Tecumseh had hit a torpedo (mine) and sank within two minutes. He then ordered the Metacomet, to which he was coupled, to send a boat to pick up survivors. Unfortunately, only a handful escaped death. Farragut then had the Hartford take the lead and supposedly made the famous cry: "Damn the torpedoes (mines), full speed ahead." Historians still argue what precisely he said, if indeed, anything along those lines.
At any rate, The Hartford crossed into the line of mines with the rest of the fleet following. All made it through unscathed. In his official report of the incident Farragut said he knew that mines were present but calculated they had been buried so long they were "innocuous." At any rate, his gamble paid off.
Once the Union fleet was in the middle of the bay and beyond the range of the Ft. Morgan guns, Farragut turned his attention to the Confederate fleet. He sent the Metacourt off to dispatch the Selma, which had been annoying the Union fleet with raking fire. Within an hour the Selma was a prize. The Gaines had been hit sufficiently that her crew beached and destroyed her. The Morgan managed to escape to the protection of Ft. Morgan's guns. During the night she was able to escape to Mobile.
Farragut assumed that the invincible CSS Tennessee would run for cover beneath the guns of Ft. Morgan. But, for whatever reason, Admiral Buchanan decided to take on the entire Union fleet, a decision which he would soon regret. Perhaps he intended to ram and sink each ship. But, because of its heavy armor the Tennessee could only muster a max speed of four knots, making it impossible to ram the faster Union ships, which themselves began ramming the Tennessee, although getting the worst end of the bargain.
But the Union ships shot away her smoke stacks and in the process made it impossible for her to build up boiler pressure. Secondly, her steering chains were exposed on deck and soon blown apart by enemy fire, making it impossible to control her movement. Furthermore, many of her gun shutters had been hit, making the guns behind them inoperable. With the situation futile, Admiral Buchanan, who had suffered a broken leg in the fray, surrendered the ship. The entire naval engagement was over in three hours. It required General Granger a few more days to neutralize all three forts: Gaines, Powell and Morgan.
At any rate, blockade runners and Confederate commercial ships no longer had access to Mobile. Therefore, it was not necessary to subdue the city. Another outcome of the battle was political. Lincoln was coming under heavy fire for high casualty rates in recent battles, especially at Cold Harbor. Most pundits believed he would not be re-elected. Many historians now credit the victory at Mobile Bay and a month later at Atlanta for saving his presidency.
Compiled by members of the CW150 Committee of Warren's Sutliff Museum.