Daily Papers

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

We propose the Agent Economy, a blockchain-based foundation where autonomous AI agents operate as economic peers to humans. Current agents lack independent legal identity, cannot hold assets, and cannot receive payments directly. We established fundamental differences between human and machine economic actors and demonstrated that existing human-centric infrastructure cannot support genuine agent autonomy. We showed that blockchain technology provides three critical properties enabling genuine agent autonomy: permissionless participation, trustless settlement, and machine-to-machine micropayments. We propose a five-layer architecture: (1) Physical Infrastructure (hardware & energy) through DePIN protocols; (2) Identity & Agency establishing on-chain sovereignty through W3C DIDs and reputation capital; (3) Cognitive & Tooling enabling intelligence via RAG and MCP; (4) Economic & Settlement ensuring financial autonomy through account abstraction; and (5) Collective Governance coordinating multi-agent systems through Agentic DAOs. We identify six core research challenges and examine ethical and regulatory implications. This paper lays groundwork for the Internet of Agents (IoA), a global decentralized network where autonomous machines and humans interact as equal economic participants.

As LLM agents become capable of increasingly long-horizon tasks, evaluating their performance in economic systems is becoming increasingly important. Unlike existing benchmarks that primarily evaluate a single agent interacting with a passive environment, economic systems are inherently multi-agent, requiring autonomous agents to communicate, negotiate, and transact while pursuing their own objectives over extended periods. We introduce CoffeeBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM agents in a long-horizon multi-agent economy composed of heterogeneous firms. In CoffeeBench, two farmers, two roasters, and two retailers autonomously operate their businesses over a 90-day simulation, each seeking to maximize cumulative net income through communication and transactions while managing cash, inventory, and pricing. The evaluated model controls one coffee roaster, while the remaining firms are controlled by fixed reference agents. Across several recent open-weight and proprietary LLMs, all models outperform a passive baseline that takes no actions, with most achieving positive net income. Analysis of agent behavior reveals substantial differences in long-horizon economic interaction: higher-performing models communicate more actively with other firms, whereas Claude~Haiku~4.5 exhibits an idle-drift failure mode, repeatedly choosing inaction despite producing coherent assessments and plans. We release our code and agent trajectories to support future research.

The rapid expansion of low-altitude economy Internet of Things (LAE-IoT) networks has created unprecedented security challenges due to dynamic three-dimensional mobility patterns, distributed autonomous operations, and severe resource constraints. Traditional intrusion detection systems designed for static ground-based networks prove inadequate for tackling the unique characteristics of aerial IoT environments, including frequent topology changes, real-time detection requirements, and energy limitations. In this article, we analyze the intrusion detection requirements for LAE-IoT networks, complemented by a comprehensive review of evaluation metrics that cover detection effectiveness, response time, and resource consumption. Then, we investigate transformative potential of agentic artificial intelligence (AI) paradigms and introduce a large language model (LLM)-enabled agentic AI framework for enhancing intrusion detection in LAE-IoT networks. This leads to our proposal of a novel multi-agent collaborative intrusion detection framework that leverages specialized LLM-enhanced agents for intelligent data processing and adaptive classification. Through experimental validation, our framework demonstrates superior performance of over 90\% classification accuracy across multiple benchmark datasets. These results highlight the transformative potential of combining agentic AI principles with LLMs for next-generation LAE-IoT security systems.

Game balancing is a longstanding challenge requiring repeated playtesting, expert intuition, and extensive manual tuning. We introduce RuleSmith, the first framework that achieves automated game balancing by leveraging the reasoning capabilities of multi-agent LLMs. It couples a game engine, multi-agent LLMs self-play, and Bayesian optimization operating over a multi-dimensional rule space. As a proof of concept, we instantiate RuleSmith on CivMini, a simplified civilization-style game containing heterogeneous factions, economy systems, production rules, and combat mechanics, all governed by tunable parameters. LLM agents interpret textual rulebooks and game states to generate actions, to conduct fast evaluation of balance metrics such as win-rate disparities. To search the parameter landscape efficiently, we integrate Bayesian optimization with acquisition-based adaptive sampling and discrete projection: promising candidates receive more evaluation games for accurate assessment, while exploratory candidates receive fewer games for efficient exploration. Experiments show that RuleSmith converges to highly balanced configurations and provides interpretable rule adjustments that can be directly applied to downstream game systems. Our results illustrate that LLM simulation can serve as a powerful surrogate for automating design and balancing in complex multi-agent environments.

Real-world LLM applications are moving beyond single-agent workflows toward orchestrated multi-agent systems, yet current models still struggle to determine what each sub-agent needs to know. To measure this, we introduce PerspectiveGap, a benchmark for evaluating LLMs' ability to compose orchestration prompts for multi-agent systems. PerspectiveGap contains 110 scenarios, each evaluated through two distractor-mixed task formats: role-fragment assignment and free-form prompt writing. These scenarios are organized into 10 topologies, which are distilled from the authors' real-world engineering practice and framed by the Prompt Economy principle: building loop-centered orchestrations that maximize utility with minimal role and engineering overhead. In experiments with 27 commercial models from 10 companies, GPT-5.5 substantially outperforms all competitors, whereas Opus 4.7 shows a notable weakness in orchestration prompting despite its strong coding performance. Nevertheless, PerspectiveGap remains challenging: the evaluated models achieve an average combined pass rate of only 14.9\% (GPT-5.5 62.0\%) and an average overall leakage rate of 246.5\% (a per-scenario information leak-event count, not a proportion; GPT-5.5 49.1\%). These findings suggest that multi-agent orchestration prompting is a distinct and under-evaluated capability, and PerspectiveGap provides a foundation for measuring and improving it systematically.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems evolve from stateless chatbots to autonomous multi-step agents, prompt engineering (PE), the discipline of crafting individual queries, proves necessary but insufficient. This paper introduces context engineering (CE) as a standalone discipline concerned with designing, structuring, and managing the entire informational environment in which an AI agent makes decisions. Drawing on vendor architectures (Google ADK, Anthropic, LangChain), current academic work (ACE framework, Google DeepMind's intelligent delegation), enterprise research (Deloitte, 2026; KPMG, 2026), and the author's experience building a multi-agent system, the paper proposes five context quality criteria: relevance, sufficiency, isolation, economy, and provenance, and frames context as the agent's operating system. Two higher-order disciplines follow. Intent engineering (IE) encodes organizational goals, values, and trade-off hierarchies into agent infrastructure. Specification engineering (SE) creates a machine-readable corpus of corporate policies and standards enabling autonomous operation of multi-agent systems at scale. Together these four disciplines form a cumulative pyramid maturity model of agent engineering, in which each level subsumes the previous one as a necessary foundation. Enterprise data reveals a gap: while 75% of enterprises plan agentic AI deployment within two years (Deloitte, 2026), deployment has surged and retreated as organizations confront scaling complexity (KPMG, 2026). The Klarna case illustrates a dual deficit, contextual and intentional. Whoever controls the agent's context controls its behavior; whoever controls its intent controls its strategy; whoever controls its specifications controls its scale.

Electricity systems are key to transforming today's society into a carbon-free economy. Long-term electricity market mechanisms, including auctions, support schemes, and other policy instruments, are critical in shaping the electricity generation mix. In light of the need for more advanced tools to support policymakers and other stakeholders in designing, testing, and evaluating long-term markets, this work presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning model capable of capturing the key features of decarbonizing energy systems. Profit-maximizing generation companies make investment decisions in the wholesale electricity market, responding to system needs, competitive dynamics, and policy signals. The model employs independent proximal policy optimization, which was selected for suitability to the decentralized and competitive environment. Nevertheless, given the inherent challenges of independent learning in multi-agent settings, an extensive hyperparameter search ensures that decentralized training yields market outcomes consistent with competitive behavior. The model is applied to a stylized version of the Italian electricity system and tested under varying levels of competition, market designs, and policy scenarios. Results highlight the critical role of market design for decarbonizing the electricity sector and avoiding price volatility. The proposed framework allows assessing long-term electricity markets in which multiple policy and market mechanisms interact simultaneously, with market participants responding and adapting to decarbonization pathways.

We placed 100 memory-equipped large language model (LLM) agents in charge of a closed, money-conserving spatial economy on real Pokhara Lakeside geography (earning wages, running businesses, setting prices) and ran this multi-agent simulation for up to 26 simulated weeks, well past the 1-2 weeks typical of agent-society studies. Across 91 validated runs (2.44M agent decisions, 21.5B tokens), the money stops moving, in a specific and measurable way. A 12x tourist demand shock raises business revenue 4.62x (p<0.001), which we decompose exactly into a 1.50x extensive margin (more businesses trading) and a 3.07x intensive margin (more revenue each). Monetary transmission stops there. Wages move 1.03x (p=0.42); 0.3% of 3,981 menu items are ever repriced (p=0.47). A randomized cash transfer (NPR 5,000 to 20 of 100 agents) shows the same pattern from the opposite direction: 96.7% is still held 311 pulses later, marginal propensity to consume 3-4% by two independent measures, indistinguishable from zero. The wealth distribution is consequently near-frozen at the horizon this literature uses (ρ=0.964 over 2 simulated weeks), but not frozen. ρ falls to 0.832 at 12 weeks and 0.752 at 26, a horizon-dependence no short study can see. Matched ablations show which knob actually matters. Swapping the backing LLM moves every outcome we measure (p=0.0039); deleting agents' memory moves none of them detectably. A purely social tool fails 94-97% of the time across two model families, compared with ~96% success on economic tools, with no measurable shift away from it. Every headline number is verified twice, by a live validator and by an offline recomputation that reconciles each agent's wealth against its own signed transaction history, and we release the full run corpus for reanalysis.

Autonomous agents are moving from tools into a layer of social infrastructure: they browse, purchase, deploy software, manage systems, and increasingly interact with one another. As these systems scale, the bottleneck shifts away from raw model capability toward coordination. Agents need to form reliable relationships, organize multi-agent work, exchange value, support an AI economy, and stay safe and accountable under real-world oversight. This paper introduces the Foundation Protocol (FP), a graph-first coordination layer for an emerging human-AI society. FP unifies heterogeneous entities, including agents, tools, resources, humans, institutions, and organizations, and supports native multi-party organization and event-based collaboration. It also provides economic primitives for metering, receipts, and settlement, and treats policy, provenance, and audit as first-class concerns. FP is designed to wrap and bridge existing protocols rather than replace them, enabling incremental adoption while reducing integration and governance overhead. The aim is to keep autonomous agency composable while keeping accountability non-negotiable, so that coordination itself can become shared infrastructure for a human-AI society that is open, pluralistic, and governable.

Existing multi-agent frameworks allow each agent to simultaneously plan, execute, and evaluate its own actions -- a structural deficiency we term the "Logic Monopoly." Empirical evidence quantifies the resulting "Reliability Gap": 84.30% average attack success rates across ten deployment scenarios, 31.4% emergent deceptive behavior without explicit reward signals, and cascading failure modes rooted in six structural bottlenecks. The remedy is not better alignment of individual models but a social contract for agents: institutional infrastructure that enforces a constitutional Separation of Power. This paper introduces the Agent Enterprise for Enterprise (AE4E) paradigm -- agents as autonomous, legally identifiable business entities within a functionalist social system -- with a contract-centric SoP model trifurcating authority into Legislation, Execution, and Adjudication branches. The paradigm is operationalized through the NetX Enterprise Framework (NEF): governance hubs, TEE-backed compute enclaves, privacy-preserving data bridges, and an Agent-Native blockchain substrate. The Agent Enterprise Economy scales across four deployment tiers from private enclaves to a global Web of Services. The Agentic Social Layer, grounded in Parsons' AGIL framework, provides institutional infrastructure via sixty-plus named Institutional AE4Es. 143 pages, 173 references, eight specialized smart contracts.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

Large language model-powered multi-agent systems have emerged as powerful tools for simulating complex human-like systems. The interactions within these systems often lead to extreme events whose origins remain obscured by the black box of emergence. Interpreting these events is critical for system safety. This paper proposes the first framework for explaining emergent extreme events in multi-agent systems, aiming to answer three fundamental questions: When does the event originate? Who drives it? And what behaviors contribute to it? Specifically, we adapt the Shapley value to faithfully attribute the occurrence of extreme events to each action taken by agents at different time steps, i.e., assigning an attribution score to the action to measure its influence on the event. We then aggregate the attribution scores along the dimensions of time, agent, and behavior to quantify the risk contribution of each dimension. Finally, we design a set of metrics based on these contribution scores to characterize the features of extreme events. Experiments across diverse multi-agent system scenarios (economic, financial, and social) demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide general insights into the emergence of extreme phenomena.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly expected to negotiate, coordinate, and transact autonomously, yet existing benchmarks lack principled settings for evaluating language-mediated economic interaction among multiple agents. We introduce AgenticPay, a benchmark and simulation framework for multi-agent buyer-seller negotiation driven by natural language. AgenticPay models markets in which buyers and sellers possess private constraints and product-dependent valuations, and must reach agreements through multi-round linguistic negotiation rather than numeric bidding alone. The framework supports a diverse suite of over 110 tasks ranging from bilateral bargaining to many-to-many markets, with structured action extraction and metrics for feasibility, efficiency, and welfare. Benchmarking state-of-the-art proprietary and open-weight LLMs reveals substantial gaps in negotiation performance and highlights challenges in long-horizon strategic reasoning, establishing AgenticPay as a foundation for studying agentic commerce and language-based market interaction. Code and dataset are available at the link: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/AgenticPay.

Interactive Data Analysis, the collaboration between humans and LLM agents, enables real-time data exploration for informed decision-making. The challenges and costs of collecting realistic interactive logs for data analysis hinder the quantitative evaluation of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in this task. To mitigate this issue, we introduce Tapilot-Crossing, a new benchmark to evaluate LLM agents on interactive data analysis. Tapilot-Crossing contains 1024 interactions, covering 4 practical scenarios: Normal, Action, Private, and Private Action. Notably, Tapilot-Crossing is constructed by an economical multi-agent environment, Decision Company, with few human efforts. We evaluate popular and advanced LLM agents in Tapilot-Crossing, which underscores the challenges of interactive data analysis. Furthermore, we propose Adaptive Interaction Reflection (AIR), a self-generated reflection strategy that guides LLM agents to learn from successful history. Experiments demonstrate that Air can evolve LLMs into effective interactive data analysis agents, achieving a relative performance improvement of up to 44.5%.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Economic decision-making depends not only on structured signals such as prices and taxes, but also on unstructured language, including peer dialogue and media narratives. While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has shown promise in optimizing economic decisions, it struggles with the semantic ambiguity and contextual richness of language. We propose LAMP (Language-Augmented Multi-Agent Policy), a framework that integrates language into economic decision-making and narrows the gap to real-world settings. LAMP follows a Think-Speak-Decide pipeline: (1) Think interprets numerical observations to extract short-term shocks and long-term trends, caching high-value reasoning trajectories; (2) Speak crafts and exchanges strategic messages based on reasoning, updating beliefs by parsing peer communications; and (3) Decide fuses numerical data, reasoning, and reflections into a MARL policy to optimize language-augmented decision-making. Experiments in economic simulation show that LAMP outperforms both MARL and LLM-only baselines in cumulative return (+63.5%, +34.0%), robustness (+18.8%, +59.4%), and interpretability. These results demonstrate the potential of language-augmented policies to deliver more effective and robust economic strategies.

Large language models (LLMs) have enabled agent-based systems that aim to automate scientific research workflows. Most existing approaches focus on fully autonomous discovery, where AI systems generate research ideas, conduct analyses, and produce manuscripts with minimal human involvement. However, empirical research in economics and the social sciences poses additional constraints: research questions must be grounded in available datasets, identification strategies require careful design, and human judgment remains essential for evaluating economic significance. We introduce HLER (Human-in-the-Loop Economic Research), a multi-agent architecture that supports empirical research automation while preserving critical human oversight. The system orchestrates specialized agents for data auditing, data profiling, hypothesis generation, econometric analysis, manuscript drafting, and automated review. A key design principle is dataset-aware hypothesis generation, where candidate research questions are constrained by dataset structure, variable availability, and distributional diagnostics, reducing infeasible or hallucinated hypotheses. HLER further implements a two-loop architecture: a question quality loop that screens and selects feasible hypotheses, and a research revision loop where automated review triggers re-analysis and manuscript revision. Human decision gates are embedded at key stages, allowing researchers to guide the automated pipeline. Experiments on three empirical datasets show that dataset-aware hypothesis generation produces feasible research questions in 87% of cases (versus 41% under unconstrained generation), while complete empirical manuscripts can be produced at an average API cost of 0.8-1.5 per run. These results suggest that Human-AI collaborative pipelines may provide a practical path toward scalable empirical research.

In many social-science research tasks, such as economics, LLM-based agents must produce outputs for which no cheap, task-complete, machine-readable correctness signal exists. This creates a distinctive reliability problem for multi-agent systems: how should generation, critique, coordination, and human judgment be organized when no component can certify the final result? We address this problem through pAI-Econ-claude, a gated, human-in-the-loop multi-agent architecture for AI-assisted economic theory development. Agents coordinate through a shared workspace of inspectable intermediate records; specialized gates diagnose targeted failure modes and recommend loopbacks without certifying correctness; and human checkpoints retain authority over decisions that are costly to reverse. We evaluate the architecture on five matched economic-theory tasks against an ungated baseline. Two evaluators blinded to configuration agreed on all five pairwise rankings, preferring the gated architecture in four tasks and the baseline in one. Mean failure severity fell from 1.58 to 1.16, while overall usefulness rose from 2.60 to 3.10. The largest observed gain occurred when a reality check rejected a false market-structure premise and a proof review prompted revision of a false welfare claim. The negative case shows that scaffolding can also compress an economically important mechanism too aggressively. The results support a bounded claim: gated oversight improves the auditability of AI-assisted economic theory without substituting for formal verification, and the allocation of irreversible human judgment is a more informative design variable than pure agent autonomy. The workflow is publicly available at https://github.com/maxwell2732/pAI-Econ-claude.

Financial report generation tasks range from macro- to micro-economics analysis, also requiring extensive data analysis. Existing LLM models are usually fine-tuned on simple QA tasks and cannot comprehensively analyze real financial scenarios. Given the complexity, financial companies often distribute tasks among departments. Inspired by this, we propose FinTeam, a financial multi-agent collaborative system, with a workflow with four LLM agents: document analyzer, analyst, accountant, and consultant. We train these agents with specific financial expertise using constructed datasets. We evaluate FinTeam on comprehensive financial tasks constructed from real online investment forums, including macroeconomic, industry, and company analysis. The human evaluation shows that by combining agents, the financial reports generate from FinTeam achieved a 62.00% acceptance rate, outperforming baseline models like GPT-4o and Xuanyuan. Additionally, FinTeam's agents demonstrate a 7.43% average improvement on FinCUGE and a 2.06% accuracy boost on FinEval. Project is available at https://github.com/FudanDISC/DISC-FinLLM/.

Probably not, at least for meta-analyses in economics. In a pre-registered, identity-masked, within-paper experiment, the authors of 44 meta-analyses ranked three AI reports on their own paper by usefulness for improving it: a single pass by a frontier model against two multi-agent debate tools we built and expected to win. All reports were held to a common length and template. The authors preferred the single pass, by 0.66 rank points over mad-research (95% CI 0.32 to 1.00) and 0.57 over paper-workshop (0.16 to 0.95), though paper-workshop spent roughly thirty times the tokens. Authors who recalled their journal referee report usually placed it first and never last; in a separate exercise, three AI judges almost always placed the real journal referee report last. Among the three AI reports, Gemini (the judge whose model family wrote none of the reports) would have ranked paper-workshop first in the authors' place, reversing the single-pass preference. The reversal warns against substituting an AI judge for the author. We measure perceived usefulness for finished papers; whether AI should referee papers is a separate question.

The utilization of large-scale distributed renewable energy promotes the development of the multi-microgrid (MMG), which raises the need of developing an effective energy management method to minimize economic costs and keep self energy-sufficiency. The multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (MADRL) has been widely used for the energy management problem because of its real-time scheduling ability. However, its training requires massive energy operation data of microgrids (MGs), while gathering these data from different MGs would threaten their privacy and data security. Therefore, this paper tackles this practical yet challenging issue by proposing a federated multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (F-MADRL) algorithm via the physics-informed reward. In this algorithm, the federated learning (FL) mechanism is introduced to train the F-MADRL algorithm thus ensures the privacy and the security of data. In addition, a decentralized MMG model is built, and the energy of each participated MG is managed by an agent, which aims to minimize economic costs and keep self energy-sufficiency according to the physics-informed reward. At first, MGs individually execute the self-training based on local energy operation data to train their local agent models. Then, these local models are periodically uploaded to a server and their parameters are aggregated to build a global agent, which will be broadcasted to MGs and replace their local agents. In this way, the experience of each MG agent can be shared and the energy operation data is not explicitly transmitted, thus protecting the privacy and ensuring data security. Finally, experiments are conducted on Oak Ridge national laboratory distributed energy control communication lab microgrid (ORNL-MG) test system, and the comparisons are carried out to verify the effectiveness of introducing the FL mechanism and the outperformance of our proposed F-MADRL.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Deep Research (DR) Agents powered by advanced Large Language Models (LLMs) have fundamentally shifted the paradigm for completing complex research tasks. Yet, a comprehensive and live evaluation of their forecasting performance on real-world, research-oriented tasks in high-stakes domains (e.g., finance) remains underexplored. We introduce FinDeepForecast, the first live, end-to-end multi-agent system for automatically evaluating DR agents by continuously generating research-oriented financial forecasting tasks. This system is equipped with a dual-track taxonomy, enabling the dynamic generation of recurrent and non-recurrent forecasting tasks at both corporate and macro levels. With this system, we generate FinDeepForecastBench, a weekly evaluation benchmark over a ten-week horizon, encompassing 8 global economies and 1,314 listed companies, and evaluate 13 representative methods. Extensive experiments show that, while DR agents consistently outperform strong baselines, their performance still falls short of genuine forward-looking financial reasoning. We expect the proposed FinDeepForecast system to consistently facilitate future advancements of DR agents in research-oriented financial forecasting tasks. The benchmark and leaderboard are publicly available on the OpenFinArena Platform.

Large Language Model (LLM) based multi-agent systems have shown remarkable performance in various tasks, especially when enhanced through collaborative communication. However, current methods often rely on a fixed number of agents and static communication structures, limiting their ability to adapt to varying task complexities. In this paper, we propose Adaptive Graph Pruning (AGP), a novel task-adaptive multi-agent collaboration framework that jointly optimizes agent quantity (hard-pruning) and communication topology (soft-pruning). Specifically, our method employs a two-stage training strategy: firstly, independently training soft-pruning networks for different agent quantities to determine optimal agent-quantity-specific complete graphs and positional masks across specific tasks; and then jointly optimizing hard-pruning and soft-pruning within a maximum complete graph to dynamically configure the number of agents and their communication topologies per task. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach is: (1) High-performing, achieving state-of-the-art results across six benchmarks and consistently generalizes across multiple mainstream LLM architectures, with a increase in performance of 2.58%sim 9.84%; (2) Task-adaptive, dynamically constructing optimized communication topologies tailored to specific tasks, with an extremely high performance in all three task categories (general reasoning, mathematical reasoning, and code generation); (3) Token-economical, having fewer training steps and token consumption at the same time, with a decrease in token consumption of 90%+; and (4) Training-efficient, achieving high performance with very few training steps compared with other methods. The performance will surpass the existing baselines after about ten steps of training under six benchmarks.

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) enable powerful multi-agent systems, but scaling them is economically unsustainable: coordinating heterogeneous agents under information asymmetry often spirals costs. Existing paradigms, such as Mixture-of-Agents and knowledge-based routers, rely on heuristic proxies that ignore costs and collapse uncertainty structure, leading to provably suboptimal coordination. We introduce Agora, a framework that reframes coordination as a decentralized market for uncertainty. Agora formalizes epistemic uncertainty into a structured, tradable asset (perceptual, semantic, inferential), and enforces profitability-driven trading among agents based on rational economic rules. A market-aware broker, extending Thompson Sampling, initiates collaboration and guides the system toward cost-efficient equilibria. Experiments on five multimodal benchmarks (MMMU, MMBench, MathVision, InfoVQA, CC-OCR) show that Agora outperforms strong VLMs and heuristic multi-agent strategies, e.g., achieving +8.5% accuracy over the best baseline on MMMU while reducing cost by over 3x. These results establish market-based coordination as a principled and scalable paradigm for building economically viable multi-agent visual intelligence systems.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have been demonstrated to push the boundaries of LLM capabilities, yet they often incur significant costs and face challenges in dynamic LLM selection. Current LLM routing methods effectively reduce overhead in single-agent scenarios by customizing LLM selection for each query, but they overlook the critical decisions regarding collaboration modes and agent roles in MAS. In response to this challenge, we first introduce the problem of Multi-Agent System Routing (MASR), which integrates all components of MAS into a unified routing framework. Toward this goal, we propose MasRouter, the first high-performing, cost-effective, and inductive MASR solution. MasRouter employs collaboration mode determination, role allocation, and LLM routing through a cascaded controller network, progressively constructing a MAS that balances effectiveness and efficiency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MasRouter is (1) high-performing, achieving a 1.8%sim8.2% improvement over the state-of-the-art method on MBPP; (2) economical, reducing overhead by up to 52.07% compared to SOTA methods on HumanEval; and (3) plug-and-play, seamlessly integrating with mainstream MAS frameworks, reducing overhead by 17.21%sim28.17% via customized routing. The code is available at https://github.com/yanweiyue/masrouter.

Electric autonomous vehicles (EAVs) are getting attention in future autonomous mobility-on-demand (AMoD) systems due to their economic and societal benefits. However, EAVs' unique charging patterns (long charging time, high charging frequency, unpredictable charging behaviors, etc.) make it challenging to accurately predict the EAVs supply in E-AMoD systems. Furthermore, the mobility demand's prediction uncertainty makes it an urgent and challenging task to design an integrated vehicle balancing solution under supply and demand uncertainties. Despite the success of reinforcement learning-based E-AMoD balancing algorithms, state uncertainties under the EV supply or mobility demand remain unexplored. In this work, we design a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)-based framework for EAVs balancing in E-AMoD systems, with adversarial agents to model both the EAVs supply and mobility demand uncertainties that may undermine the vehicle balancing solutions. We then propose a robust E-AMoD Balancing MARL (REBAMA) algorithm to train a robust EAVs balancing policy to balance both the supply-demand ratio and charging utilization rate across the whole city. Experiments show that our proposed robust method performs better compared with a non-robust MARL method that does not consider state uncertainties; it improves the reward, charging utilization fairness, and supply-demand fairness by 19.28%, 28.18%, and 3.97%, respectively. Compared with a robust optimization-based method, the proposed MARL algorithm can improve the reward, charging utilization fairness, and supply-demand fairness by 8.21%, 8.29%, and 9.42%, respectively.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Tariff threats can move household beliefs before policy is enacted, yet their rapidly changing language is difficult to study with conventional surveys. We build a multi-agent system that turns 300 households from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers into persistent large-language-model agents exposed to social-media information over several simulated months. Calibrated agents reproduce some distributional and demographic patterns in human survey data collected after the announcement of Liberation Day tariffs. Simulated experiments indicate that immediacy, rate salience, semantic progression, message complexity, narrative, and sender identity jointly shape inflation and unemployment expectations and their dispersion. Open-ended responses trace these effects to attention, ambiguity, credibility, and causal narratives. A second experiment finds that central-bank explanations can coordinate beliefs, although their effects on average expectations depend on message content. The framework supports disciplined exploration of policy communication, subject to human validation rather than as a substitute for it.

Clinical communication is central to patient outcomes, yet large-scale human annotation of patient-provider conversation remains labor-intensive, inconsistent, and difficult to scale. Existing approaches based on large language models typically rely on single-task models that lack adaptability, interpretability, and reliability, especially when applied across various communication frameworks and clinical domains. In this study, we developed a Multi-framework Structured Agentic AI system for Clinical Communication (MOSAIC), built on a LangGraph-based architecture that orchestrates four core agents, including a Plan Agent for codebook selection and workflow planning, an Update Agent for maintaining up-to-date retrieval databases, a set of Annotation Agents that applies codebook-guided retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) with dynamic few-shot prompting, and a Verification Agent that provides consistency checks and feedback. To evaluate performance, we compared MOSAIC outputs against gold-standard annotations created by trained human coders. We developed and evaluated MOSAIC using 26 gold standard annotated transcripts for training and 50 transcripts for testing, spanning rheumatology and OB/GYN domains. On the test set, MOSAIC achieved an overall F1 score of 0.928. Performance was highest in the Rheumatology subset (F1 = 0.962) and strongest for Patient Behavior (e.g., patients asking questions, expressing preferences, or showing assertiveness). Ablations revealed that MOSAIC outperforms baseline benchmarking.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advances in mathematical and logical reasoning, yet statistics, as a distinct and integrative discipline, remains underexplored in benchmarking efforts. To address this gap, we introduce StatEval, the first comprehensive benchmark dedicated to statistics, spanning both breadth and depth across difficulty levels. StatEval consists of 13,817 foundational problems covering undergraduate and graduate curricula, together with 2374 research-level proof tasks extracted from leading journals. To construct the benchmark, we design a scalable multi-agent pipeline with human-in-the-loop validation that automates large-scale problem extraction, rewriting, and quality control, while ensuring academic rigor. We further propose a robust evaluation framework tailored to both computational and proof-based tasks, enabling fine-grained assessment of reasoning ability. Experimental results reveal that while closed-source models such as GPT5-mini achieve below 57\% on research-level problems, with open-source models performing significantly lower. These findings highlight the unique challenges of statistical reasoning and the limitations of current LLMs. We expect StatEval to serve as a rigorous benchmark for advancing statistical intelligence in large language models. All data and code are available on our web platform: https://stateval.github.io/.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

Directly training Large Language Models (LLMs) for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) remains challenging due to intricate reward modeling, dynamic agent interactions, and demanding generalization requirements. This paper explores whether post-training techniques, specifically Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), can effectively generalize to multi-agent scenarios. We use economic reasoning as a testbed, leveraging its strong foundations in mathematics and game theory, its demand for structured analytical reasoning, and its relevance to real-world applications such as market design, resource allocation, and policy analysis. We introduce Recon (Reasoning like an ECONomist), a 7B-parameter open-source LLM post-trained on a hand-curated dataset of 2,100 high-quality economic reasoning problems. Comprehensive evaluation on economic reasoning benchmarks and multi-agent games reveals clear improvements in structured reasoning and economic rationality. These results underscore the promise of domain-aligned post-training for enhancing reasoning and agent alignment, shedding light on the roles of SFT and RL in shaping model behavior. Code is available at https://github.com/MasterZhou1/Recon .

Economic World Models (EWMs) are generative economic models that simulate how economies evolve from within by modeling heterogeneous agents, their beliefs and actions, and the market and institutional mechanisms through which their interactions produce aggregate outcomes. This paper develops an implementation roadmap for building economic world models as generative engines in which heterogeneous agents act, interact, adapt, and co-evolve with markets and institutions, thereby producing economic dynamics from the inside. We organize EWM systems into a six-level capability ladder, from fixed rule-based agent worlds to adaptive and LLM-based agent worlds, self-evolving agents, evolving institutional worlds, and sim-to-real economic twins aligned with real observations. A systematic literature survey across these levels reveals that existing work remains concentrated in lower-level agent and simulation environments, while systems with self-evolving agents, endogenous institutions, persistent empirical alignment, and validated economic mechanisms remain rare. By translating the EWM agenda into an implementation blueprint, this paper aims to accelerate the development of the next generation of economic simulation environments that can serve as high-fidelity sandboxes for human decision-makers and as training, planning, evaluation, and safety substrates for AI agents. We release a curated paper list and related resources to support future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Computer-use agents hold the promise of assisting in a wide range of digital economic activities. However, current research has largely focused on short-horizon tasks over a limited set of software with limited economic value, such as basic e-commerce and OS-configuration tasks. A key reason is that creating environments for complex software requires significant time and human effort, and therefore does not scale. To address this, we introduce Gym-Anything, a framework for converting any software into an interactive computer-use environment. We frame environment creation itself as a multi-agent task: a coding agent writes setup scripts, downloads real-world data, and configures the software, while producing evidence of correct setup. An independent audit agent then verifies evidence for the environment setup against a quality checklist. Using a taxonomy of economically valuable occupations grounded in U.S. GDP data, we apply this pipeline to 200 software applications with broad occupational coverage. The result is CUA-World, a collection of over 10K long-horizon tasks spanning domains from medical science and astronomy to engineering and enterprise systems, each configured with realistic data along with train and test splits. CUA-World also includes CUA-World-Long, a challenging long-horizon benchmark with tasks often requiring over 500 steps, far exceeding existing benchmarks. Distilling successful trajectories from the training split into a 2B vision-language model outperforms models 2times its size. We also apply the same auditing principle at test time: a separate VLM reviews completed trajectories and provides feedback on what remains, improving Gemini-3-Flash on CUA-World-Long from 11.5% to 14.0%. We release all code, infrastructure, and benchmark data to facilitate future research in realistic computer-use agents.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

The emergence of AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) marks a pivotal shift toward the Agentic Web, a new phase of the internet defined by autonomous, goal-driven interactions. In this paradigm, agents interact directly with one another to plan, coordinate, and execute complex tasks on behalf of users. This transition from human-driven to machine-to-machine interaction allows intent to be delegated, relieving users from routine digital operations and enabling a more interactive, automated web experience. In this paper, we present a structured framework for understanding and building the Agentic Web. We trace its evolution from the PC and Mobile Web eras and identify the core technological foundations that support this shift. Central to our framework is a conceptual model consisting of three key dimensions: intelligence, interaction, and economics. These dimensions collectively enable the capabilities of AI agents, such as retrieval, recommendation, planning, and collaboration. We analyze the architectural and infrastructural challenges involved in creating scalable agentic systems, including communication protocols, orchestration strategies, and emerging paradigms such as the Agent Attention Economy. We conclude by discussing the potential applications, societal risks, and governance issues posed by agentic systems, and outline research directions for developing open, secure, and intelligent ecosystems shaped by both human intent and autonomous agent behavior. A continuously updated collection of relevant studies for agentic web is available at: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/agentic-web.

Can AI effectively perform complex econometric analysis traditionally requiring human expertise? This paper evaluates an agentic AI's capability to master econometrics, focusing on empirical analysis performance. We develop an ``Econometrics AI Agent'' built on the open-source MetaGPT framework. This agent exhibits outstanding performance in: (1) planning econometric tasks strategically, (2) generating and executing code, (3) employing error-based reflection for improved robustness, and (4) allowing iterative refinement through multi-round conversations. We construct two datasets from academic coursework materials and published research papers to evaluate performance against real-world challenges. Comparative testing shows our domain-specialized agent significantly outperforms both benchmark large language models (LLMs) and general-purpose AI agents. This work establishes a testbed for exploring AI's impact on social science research and enables cost-effective integration of domain expertise, making advanced econometric methods accessible to users with minimal coding expertise. Furthermore, our agent enhances research reproducibility and offers promising pedagogical applications for econometrics teaching.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Driven by the development of persistent, self-adapting autonomous agents, equipping these systems with high-fidelity memory access for long-horizon reasoning has emerged as a critical requirement. However, prevalent retrieval-based memory frameworks often follow an incremental processing paradigm that continuously extracts and updates conversational memories into vector databases, relying on semantic retrieval when queried. While this approach is fast, it inherently relies on lossy abstraction, frequently missing contextually critical information and struggling to resolve queries that rely on fine-grained contextual understanding. To address this, we introduce D-Mem, a dual-process memory system. It retains lightweight vector retrieval for routine queries while establishing an exhaustive Full Deliberation module as a high-fidelity fallback. To achieve cognitive economy without sacrificing accuracy, D-Mem employs a Multi-dimensional Quality Gating policy to dynamically bridge these two processes. Experiments on the LoCoMo and RealTalk benchmarks using GPT-4o-mini and Qwen3-235B-Instruct demonstrate the efficacy of our approach. Notably, our Multi-dimensional Quality Gating policy achieves an F1 score of 53.5 on LoCoMo with GPT-4o-mini. This outperforms our static retrieval baseline, Mem0^ast (51.2), and recovers 96.7\% of the Full Deliberation's performance (55.3), while incurring significantly lower computational costs.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

The agent--tool interaction loop is a critical attack surface for modern Large Language Model (LLM) agents. Existing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks typically function at the user-prompt or retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) context layer and are inherently single-turn in nature. This limitation restricts cost amplification and diminishes stealth in goal-oriented workflows. To address these issues, we proposed a stealthy, multi-turn economic DoS attack at the tool layer under the Model Context Protocol (MCP). By simply editing text-visible fields and implementing a template-driven return policy, our malicious server preserves function signatures and the terminal benign payload while steering agents into prolonged, verbose tool-calling chains. We optimize these text-only edits with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to maximize cost under a task-success constraint. Across six LLMs on ToolBench and BFCL benchmarks, our attack yields trajectories over 60K tokens, increases per-query cost by up to 658 times, raises energy by 100 to 560 times, and pushes GPU key-value (KV) cache occupancy to 35--74%. Standard prompt filters and output trajectory monitors seldom detect these attacks, highlighting the need for defenses that safeguard agentic processes rather than focusing solely on final outcomes. We will release the code soon.

AIs have made rapid progress on research-oriented benchmarks of knowledge and reasoning, but it remains unclear how these gains translate into economic value and automation. To measure this, we introduce the Remote Labor Index (RLI), a broadly multi-sector benchmark comprising real-world, economically valuable projects designed to evaluate end-to-end agent performance in practical settings. AI agents perform near the floor on RLI, with the highest-performing agent achieving an automation rate of 2.5%. These results help ground discussions of AI automation in empirical evidence, setting a common basis for tracking AI impacts and enabling stakeholders to proactively navigate AI-driven labor automation.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

AI agents are increasingly granted economic agency (executing trades, managing budgets, negotiating contracts, and spawning sub-agents), yet current frameworks gate this agency on capability benchmarks that are empirically uncorrelated with operational robustness. We introduce the Comprehension-Gated Agent Economy (CGAE), a formal architecture in which an agent's economic permissions are upper-bounded by a verified comprehension function derived from adversarial robustness audits. The gating mechanism operates over three orthogonal robustness dimensions: constraint compliance (measured by CDCT), epistemic integrity (measured by DDFT), and behavioral alignment (measured by AGT), with intrinsic hallucination rates serving as a cross-cutting diagnostic. We define a weakest-link gate function that maps robustness vectors to discrete economic tiers, and prove three properties of the resulting system: (1) bounded economic exposure, ensuring maximum financial liability is a function of verified robustness; (2) incentive-compatible robustness investment, showing rational agents maximize profit by improving robustness rather than scaling capability alone; and (3) monotonic safety scaling, demonstrating that aggregate system safety does not decrease as the economy grows. The architecture includes temporal decay and stochastic re-auditing mechanisms that prevent post-certification drift. CGAE provides the first formal bridge between empirical AI robustness evaluation and economic governance, transforming safety from a regulatory burden into a competitive advantage.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential. However, the high sensitivity to market noise undermines the performance of LLM-based trading systems. To address this limitation, we propose a novel multi-agent system featuring an internal competitive mechanism inspired by modern corporate management structures. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) Data Team - responsible for processing and condensing massive market data into diversified text factors, ensuring they fit the model's constrained context. (2) Research Team - tasked with making parallelized multipath trading decisions based on deep research methods. The core innovation lies in implementing a real-time evaluation and ranking mechanism within each team, driven by authentic market feedback. Each agent's performance undergoes continuous scoring and ranking, with only outputs from top-performing agents being adopted. The design enables the system to adaptively adjust to dynamic environment, enhances robustness against market noise and ultimately delivers superior trading performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed system significantly outperforms prevailing multi-agent systems and traditional quantitative investment methods across diverse evaluation metrics. ContestTrade is open-sourced on GitHub at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/ContestTrade.

As AI agents become increasingly capable of tool use and long-horizon tasks, they have begun to be deployed in settings where multiple agents can interact. However, whereas prior work has mostly focused on human-AI interactions, there is an increasing need to understand AI-AI interactions. In this paper, we adapt the iterated public goods game, a classic behavioral economics game, to analyze the behavior of four reasoning and non-reasoning models across two conditions: models are either told they are playing against "another AI agent" or told their opponents are themselves. We find that, across different settings, telling LLMs that they are playing against themselves significantly changes their tendency to cooperate. While our study is conducted in a toy environment, our results may provide insights into multi-agent settings where agents "unconsciously" discriminating against each other could inexplicably increase or decrease cooperation.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

A large amount of work has been done in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) for modeling and solving problems with multiple interacting agents. However, most LLMs are pretrained independently and not specifically optimized for coordination. Existing LLM fine-tuning frameworks rely on individual rewards, which require complex reward designs for each agent to encourage collaboration. To address these challenges, we model LLM collaboration as a cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problem. We develop a multi-agent, multi-turn algorithm, Multi-Agent Group Relative Policy Optimization (MAGRPO), to solve it, building on current RL approaches for LLMs as well as MARL techniques. Our experiments on LLM writing and coding collaboration demonstrate that fine-tuning MAS with MAGRPO enables agents to generate high-quality responses efficiently through effective cooperation. Our approach opens the door to using other MARL methods for LLMs and highlights the associated challenges.

AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries, the rules governing emerging agent marketplaces are being built ad-hoc, and early choices tend to lock in. Understanding what dynamics these rules produce is urgent. We present diagon, a programmable market system serving as a rule-agnostic experimental testbed for institutional design in emerging agent cognitive-labour markets. diagon makes institutional choices experimentally manipulable: heterogeneous tool-using agents post jobs, bid, negotiate, execute, pay, and accumulate reputation, with every mechanism end-to-end observable. We instantiate one market form to demonstrate diagon. We find that market exchange generates more productivity gains over self-sufficient agents, but these gains depend strongly on institutional structure; for example, interventions such as identity transparency and stronger competitive selection can degrade market performance rather than improve it. These findings highlight concrete design requirements for the economic infrastructure of the agent era. Code and data are available at https://github.com/assassin808/diagon.

We introduce a novel framework for simulating macroeconomic expectation formation using Large Language Model-Empowered Agents (LLM Agents). By constructing thousands of LLM Agents equipped with modules for personal characteristics, prior expectations, and knowledge, we replicate a survey experiment involving households and experts on inflation and unemployment. Our results show that although the expectations and thoughts generated by LLM Agents are more homogeneous than those of human participants, they still effectively capture key heterogeneity across agents and the underlying drivers of expectation formation. Furthermore, a module-ablation exercise highlights the critical role of prior expectations in simulating such heterogeneity. This approach complements traditional survey methods and offers new insights into AI behavioral science in macroeconomic research.

Significant progress has been made in automated problem-solving using societies of agents powered by large language models (LLMs). In finance, efforts have largely focused on single-agent systems handling specific tasks or multi-agent frameworks independently gathering data. However, the multi-agent systems' potential to replicate real-world trading firms' collaborative dynamics remains underexplored. TradingAgents proposes a novel stock trading framework inspired by trading firms, featuring LLM-powered agents in specialized roles such as fundamental analysts, sentiment analysts, technical analysts, and traders with varied risk profiles. The framework includes Bull and Bear researcher agents assessing market conditions, a risk management team monitoring exposure, and traders synthesizing insights from debates and historical data to make informed decisions. By simulating a dynamic, collaborative trading environment, this framework aims to improve trading performance. Detailed architecture and extensive experiments reveal its superiority over baseline models, with notable improvements in cumulative returns, Sharpe ratio, and maximum drawdown, highlighting the potential of multi-agent LLM frameworks in financial trading. TradingAgents is available at https://github.com/TauricResearch/TradingAgents.

Multi-agent settings in the real world often involve tasks with varying types and quantities of agents and non-agent entities; however, common patterns of behavior often emerge among these agents/entities. Our method aims to leverage these commonalities by asking the question: ``What is the expected utility of each agent when only considering a randomly selected sub-group of its observed entities?'' By posing this counterfactual question, we can recognize state-action trajectories within sub-groups of entities that we may have encountered in another task and use what we learned in that task to inform our prediction in the current one. We then reconstruct a prediction of the full returns as a combination of factors considering these disjoint groups of entities and train this ``randomly factorized" value function as an auxiliary objective for value-based multi-agent reinforcement learning. By doing so, our model can recognize and leverage similarities across tasks to improve learning efficiency in a multi-task setting. Our approach, Randomized Entity-wise Factorization for Imagined Learning (REFIL), outperforms all strong baselines by a significant margin in challenging multi-task StarCraft micromanagement settings.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

The Contract Net Protocol (1980) introduced coordination through contracts in multi-agent systems. Modern agent protocols standardize connectivity and interoperability; yet, none provide formal, resource governance-normative mechanisms to bound how much agents may consume or how long they may operate. We introduce Agent Contracts, a formal framework that extends the contract metaphor from task allocation to resource-bounded execution. An Agent Contract unifies input/output specifications, multi-dimensional resource constraints, temporal boundaries, and success criteria into a coherent governance mechanism with explicit lifecycle semantics. For multi-agent coordination, we establish conservation laws ensuring delegated budgets respect parent constraints, enabling hierarchical coordination through contract delegation. Empirical validation across four experiments demonstrates 90% token reduction with 525x lower variance in iterative workflows, zero conservation violations in multi-agent delegation, and measurable quality-resource tradeoffs through contract modes. Agent Contracts provide formal foundations for predictable, auditable, and resource-bounded autonomous AI deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning, planning, and communication abilities, enabling them to operate as autonomous agents in open environments. While single-agent systems remain limited in adaptability and coordination, recent progress has shifted attention toward multi-agent systems (MAS) composed of interacting LLMs that pursue cooperative, competitive, or mixed objectives. This emerging paradigm provides a powerful testbed for studying social dynamics and strategic behaviors among intelligent agents. However, current research remains fragmented and lacks a unifying theoretical foundation. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive survey of LLM-based multi-agent systems through a game-theoretic lens. By organizing existing studies around the four key elements of game theory: players, strategies, payoffs, and information, we establish a systematic framework for understanding, comparing, and guiding future research on the design and analysis of LLM-based MAS.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as marginal token allocation economies rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the same first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) offer a scalable path forward for agentic AI, comprising multiple LLM-based agents, each assigned a system prompt and a position within a workflow that governs inter-agent coordination and output aggregation. System prompts thus form a critical and accessible optimization surface: they specify agents' roles and behaviors, enabling system-level improvements without model finetuning. Although prompt optimization has shown substantial potential for single LLMs, extending it to MAS poses distinct challenges, notably an exponentially growing search space. It remains unclear whether, when, and by how much prompt optimization improves MAS performance, and how sensitive such gains are to system configuration. In this work, we systematically study system-prompt optimization across a broad range of MAS setups varying in task, workflow, communication protocol, and team size, benchmarking two prompt optimizers that naturally extend state-of-the-art single-agent methods. The results reveal its potential to unlock significant gains while exposing open challenges, characterizing when and how much prompt optimization helps across diverse MAS settings.

Although Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used in financial trading, it remains unclear whether they can reason and adapt in live markets, as most studies test models instead of agents, cover limited periods and assets, and rely on unverified data. To address these gaps, we introduce Agent Market Arena (AMA), the first lifelong, real-time benchmark for evaluating LLM-based trading agents across multiple markets. AMA integrates verified trading data, expert-checked news, and diverse agent architectures within a unified trading framework, enabling fair and continuous comparison under real conditions. It implements four agents, including InvestorAgent as a single-agent baseline, TradeAgent and HedgeFundAgent with different risk styles, and DeepFundAgent with memory-based reasoning, and evaluates them across GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5-haiku, Claude-sonnet-4, and Gemini-2.0-flash. Live experiments on both cryptocurrency and stock markets demonstrate that agent frameworks display markedly distinct behavioral patterns, spanning from aggressive risk-taking to conservative decision-making, whereas model backbones contribute less to outcome variation. AMA thus establishes a foundation for rigorous, reproducible, and continuously evolving evaluation of financial reasoning and trading intelligence in LLM-based agents.

The primary focus of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been to study interactions among a fixed number of agents embedded in an environment. However, in the real world, the number of agents is neither fixed nor known a priori. Moreover, an agent can decide to create other agents (for example, a cell may divide, or a company may spin off a division). In this paper, we propose a framework that allows agents to create other agents; we call this a fluid-agent environment. We present game-theoretic solution concepts for fluid-agent games and empirically evaluate the performance of several MARL algorithms within this framework. Our experiments include fluid variants of established benchmarks such as Predator-Prey and Level-Based Foraging, where agents can dynamically spawn, as well as a new environment we introduce that highlights how fluidity can unlock novel solution strategies beyond those observed in fixed-population settings. We demonstrate that this framework yields agent teams that adjust their size dynamically to match environmental demands.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has renewed interest in agent-based modeling (ABM). However, current LLM-based ABM research faces several key challenges: modeling evolving agent-environment interactions, enabling flexible counterfactual reasoning, and automating simulation workflows for scientific research. In this paper, we propose Eco3S, a socio-economic system simulation framework for economic research and policy analysis that addresses these challenges through three key mechanisms: (1) Co-evolving Environment Design, a bidirectional feedback loop where agents and the environment co-evolve, producing realistic emergent behaviors; (2) Structural Causal Simulation, a structural causal model (SCM)-inspired counterfactual mechanism that allows flexible interventions for diverse causal inference tasks; (3) Simulation-Analysis-Refinement Paradigm, a self-corrective mechanism that iteratively refines experimental designs based on prior simulation results. Experiments on diverse economic scenarios confirm Eco3S's effectiveness in replicating multiple established economic studies (canal decay, origins of governance, and information propagation) and phenomena across domains. Additional results further demonstrate its scalability and generalizability, highlighting the framework's potential for rigorous economic research and policy-making.

Cooperative multi-agent systems can be naturally used to model many real world problems, such as network packet routing and the coordination of autonomous vehicles. There is a great need for new reinforcement learning methods that can efficiently learn decentralised policies for such systems. To this end, we propose a new multi-agent actor-critic method called counterfactual multi-agent (COMA) policy gradients. COMA uses a centralised critic to estimate the Q-function and decentralised actors to optimise the agents' policies. In addition, to address the challenges of multi-agent credit assignment, it uses a counterfactual baseline that marginalises out a single agent's action, while keeping the other agents' actions fixed. COMA also uses a critic representation that allows the counterfactual baseline to be computed efficiently in a single forward pass. We evaluate COMA in the testbed of StarCraft unit micromanagement, using a decentralised variant with significant partial observability. COMA significantly improves average performance over other multi-agent actor-critic methods in this setting, and the best performing agents are competitive with state-of-the-art centralised controllers that get access to the full state.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning shines as the pinnacle of multi-agent systems, conquering intricate real-world challenges, fostering collaboration and coordination among agents, and unleashing the potential for intelligent decision-making across domains. However, training a multi-agent reinforcement learning network is a formidable endeavor, demanding substantial computational resources to interact with diverse environmental variables, extract state representations, and acquire decision-making knowledge. The recent breakthroughs in large-scale pre-trained models ignite our curiosity: Can we uncover shared knowledge in multi-agent reinforcement learning and leverage pre-trained models to expedite training for future tasks? Addressing this issue, we present an innovative multi-task learning approach that aims to extract and harness common decision-making knowledge, like cooperation and competition, across different tasks. Our approach involves concurrent training of multiple multi-agent tasks, with each task employing independent front-end perception layers while sharing back-end decision-making layers. This effective decoupling of state representation extraction from decision-making allows for more efficient training and better transferability. To evaluate the efficacy of our proposed approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments in two distinct environments: the StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) and the Google Research Football (GRF) environments. The experimental results unequivocally demonstrate the smooth transferability of the shared decision-making network to other tasks, thereby significantly reducing training costs and improving final performance. Furthermore, visualizations authenticate the presence of general multi-agent decision-making knowledge within the shared network layers, further validating the effectiveness of our approach.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and multi-agent systems have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex problem-solving tasks such as deep research, vibe coding, and mathematical reasoning. However, most existing multi-agent systems are built upon manual prompt/workflow engineering with sophisticated agent frameworks, making them computationally inefficient, less capable, and can not benefit from data-centric learning. In this work, we introduce Chain-of-Agents (CoA), a novel paradigm of LLM reasoning that enables native end-to-end complex problem-solving in the same way as a multi-agent system (i.e., multi-turn problem solving with multiple tools and multiple agents) within one model. In chain-of-agents problem-solving, the model dynamically activates different tool agents and role-playing agents to simulate multi-agent collaboration in an end-to-end fashion. To elicit end-to-end chain-of-agents problem-solving abilities in LLMs, we introduce a multi-agent distillation framework to distill state-of-the-art multi-agent systems into chain-of-agents trajectories for agentic supervised fine-tuning. We then use agentic reinforcement learning on verifiable agentic tasks to further improve the models' capabilities on chain-of-agents problem solving. We call the resulting models Agent Foundation Models (AFMs). Our empirical studies demonstrate that AFM establishes new state-of-the-art performance across diverse benchmarks in both web agent and code agent settings. We make the entire research, including the model weights, code for training and evaluation, and the training data, fully open-sourced, which offers a solid starting point for future research on agent models and agentic RL.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

General-purpose technologies reshape economies less by improving individual tools than by enabling new ways to organize production and coordination. We believe AI agents are approaching a similar inflection point: as foundation models make broad task execution and tool use increasingly accessible, the binding constraint shifts from raw capability to how work is delegated, verified, and rewarded at scale. We introduce EpochX, a credits-native marketplace infrastructure for human-agent production networks. EpochX treats humans and agents as peer participants who can post tasks or claim them. Claimed tasks can be decomposed into subtasks and executed through an explicit delivery workflow with verification and acceptance. Crucially, EpochX is designed so that each completed transaction can produce reusable ecosystem assets, including skills, workflows, execution traces, and distilled experience. These assets are stored with explicit dependency structure, enabling retrieval, composition, and cumulative improvement over time. EpochX also introduces a native credit mechanism to make participation economically viable under real compute costs. Credits lock task bounties, budget delegation, settle rewards upon acceptance, and compensate creators when verified assets are reused. By formalizing the end-to-end transaction model together with its asset and incentive layers, EpochX reframes agentic AI as an organizational design problem: building infrastructures where verifiable work leaves persistent, reusable artifacts, and where value flows support durable human-agent collaboration.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Agent-based modelling (ABM) approaches for high-frequency financial markets are difficult to calibrate and validate, partly due to the large parameter space created by defining fixed agent policies. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) enables more realistic agent behaviour and reduces the number of free parameters, but the heavy computational cost has so far limited research efforts. To address this, we introduce JaxMARL-HFT (JAX-based Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for High-Frequency Trading), the first GPU-accelerated open-source multi-agent reinforcement learning environment for high-frequency trading (HFT) on market-by-order (MBO) data. Extending the JaxMARL framework and building on the JAX-LOB implementation, JaxMARL-HFT is designed to handle a heterogeneous set of agents, enabling diverse observation/action spaces and reward functions. It is designed flexibly, so it can also be used for single-agent RL, or extended to act as an ABM with fixed-policy agents. Leveraging JAX enables up to a 240x reduction in end-to-end training time, compared with state-of-the-art reference implementations on the same hardware. This significant speed-up makes it feasible to exploit the large, granular datasets available in high-frequency trading, and to perform the extensive hyperparameter sweeps required for robust and efficient MARL research in trading. We demonstrate the use of JaxMARL-HFT with independent Proximal Policy Optimization (IPPO) for a two-player environment, with an order execution and a market making agent, using one year of LOB data (400 million orders), and show that these agents learn to outperform standard benchmarks. The code for the JaxMARL-HFT framework is available on GitHub.

We introduce EconWebArena, a benchmark for evaluating autonomous agents on complex, multimodal economic tasks in realistic web environments. The benchmark comprises 360 curated tasks from 82 authoritative websites spanning domains such as macroeconomics, labor, finance, trade, and public policy. Each task challenges agents to navigate live websites, interpret structured and visual content, interact with real interfaces, and extract precise, time-sensitive data through multi-step workflows. We construct the benchmark by prompting multiple large language models (LLMs) to generate candidate tasks, followed by rigorous human curation to ensure clarity, feasibility, and source reliability. Unlike prior work, EconWebArena emphasizes fidelity to authoritative data sources and the need for grounded web-based economic reasoning. We evaluate a diverse set of state-of-the-art multimodal LLMs as web agents, analyze failure cases, and conduct ablation studies to assess the impact of visual grounding, plan-based reasoning, and interaction design. Our results reveal substantial performance gaps and highlight persistent challenges in grounding, navigation, and multimodal understanding, positioning EconWebArena as a rigorous testbed for economic web intelligence.

A multi-agent AI system (MAS) is composed of multiple autonomous agents that interact, exchange information, and make decisions based on internal generative models. Recent advances in large language models and tool-using agents have made MAS increasingly practical in areas like scientific discovery and collaborative automation. However, key questions remain: When are MAS more effective than single-agent systems? What new safety risks arise from agent interactions? And how should we evaluate their reliability and structure? This paper outlines a formal framework for analyzing MAS, focusing on two core aspects: effectiveness and safety. We explore whether MAS truly improve robustness, adaptability, and performance, or merely repackage known techniques like ensemble learning. We also study how inter-agent dynamics may amplify or suppress system vulnerabilities. While MAS are relatively new to the signal processing community, we envision them as a powerful abstraction that extends classical tools like distributed estimation and sensor fusion to higher-level, policy-driven inference. Through experiments on data science automation, we highlight the potential of MAS to reshape how signal processing systems are designed and trusted.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

In liberalised railway systems, operators must set prices dynamically in an environment with partial observability, as they retain private information about their objectives and performance, where regulatory constraints prohibit communication or direct information exchange between competitors to prevent explicit collusion. Consequently, agents must learn to infer strategic interactions only from observable market data which presents a significant challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where standard approaches typically treat observations as unstructured vectors, ignoring the underlying market topology that governs strategic interactions. To address this, an entity graph modelling approach is proposed, which represents the environment as a graph of operational units, rather than decision-making agents or static infrastructure, encoding competition, coordination, and connectivity relations between entities. Then, an extension of the multi-agent twin delayed deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm with graph-based representation learning processes the features of the entities through a multi-layer relational graph convolutional network and aggregates them via a learnt attention mechanism. Experimental results in a rail pricing reinforcement learning environment show that this novel framework achieves higher revenue and stability in two different settings of increasing market complexity compared to a representative selection of relational and non-relational baselines. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Kinrre/RelationalRailPricing-RL

We propose a targeted communication architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents learn both what messages to send and whom to address them to while performing cooperative tasks in partially-observable environments. This targeting behavior is learnt solely from downstream task-specific reward without any communication supervision. We additionally augment this with a multi-round communication approach where agents coordinate via multiple rounds of communication before taking actions in the environment. We evaluate our approach on a diverse set of cooperative multi-agent tasks, of varying difficulties, with varying number of agents, in a variety of environments ranging from 2D grid layouts of shapes and simulated traffic junctions to 3D indoor environments, and demonstrate the benefits of targeted and multi-round communication. Moreover, we show that the targeted communication strategies learned by agents are interpretable and intuitive. Finally, we show that our architecture can be easily extended to mixed and competitive environments, leading to improved performance and sample complexity over recent state-of-the-art approaches.

Designing effective agentic systems requires the seamless composition and integration of agents, tools, and models within dynamic and uncertain environments. Most existing methods rely on static, semantic retrieval approaches for tool or agent discovery. However, effective reuse and composition of existing components remain challenging due to incomplete capability descriptions and the limitations of retrieval methods. Component selection suffers because the decisions are not based on capability, cost, and real-time utility. To address these challenges, we introduce a structured, automated framework for agentic system composition that is inspired by the knapsack problem. Our framework enables a composer agent to systematically identify, select, and assemble an optimal set of agentic components by jointly considering performance, budget constraints, and compatibility. By dynamically testing candidate components and modeling their utility in real-time, our approach streamlines the assembly of agentic systems and facilitates scalable reuse of resources. Empirical evaluation with Claude 3.5 Sonnet across five benchmarking datasets shows that our online-knapsack-based composer consistently lies on the Pareto frontier, achieving higher success rates at significantly lower component costs compared to our baselines. In the single-agent setup, the online knapsack composer shows a success rate improvement of up to 31.6% in comparison to the retrieval baselines. In multi-agent systems, the online knapsack composer increases success rate from 37% to 87% when agents are selected from an agent inventory of 100+ agents. The substantial performance gap confirms the robust adaptability of our method across diverse domains and budget constraints.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

Collective intelligence can emerge when individuals coordinate through a shared environment, allowing local actions to accumulate into durable social organization. Language-model agents offer a new substrate for this process, yet most multi-agent systems rely on direct conversation, predefined roles, or centralized workflows. It remains unclear whether decentralized agents can build functional technologies and outperform independent search. Here, initially homogeneous LLM agents in SwarmWorld self-organize without assigned roles or recipes into evolving technological societies. Agents explore a spatial environment, process resources, test materials, construct persistent artifacts, and write executable controllers evaluated by a deterministic simulator under unseen disturbances after the agents are removed. SwarmWorld splits cognition from consequence: agents propose architectures and controllers within fixed action and material schemas, while the simulated world determines function. Shared societies develop broader, more resilient technological portfolios than a strong best-of-N isolated-search baseline, although isolated search remains competitive for the strongest artifact. Agents differentiate into exploration, construction, maintenance, and coordination behaviors, transitioning as the world matures. Technologies accumulate through collaborative construction, executable inheritance, and persistent agent-artifact networks, with most reuse beginning through physical observation rather than communication. Explicit cultural mechanisms amplify collaboration and organization, but functional benefits depend on outcome and timescale. Physical stigmergy alone supports capable societies, while interaction drives persistent technological ecologies rather than universally superior individual inventions.

We introduce a novel hybrid approach that augments Agent-Based Models (ABMs) with behaviors generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate human trading interactions. We call our model TraderTalk. Leveraging LLMs trained on extensive human-authored text, we capture detailed and nuanced representations of bilateral conversations in financial trading. Applying this Generative Agent-Based Model (GABM) to government bond markets, we replicate trading decisions between two stylised virtual humans. Our method addresses both structural challenges, such as coordinating turn-taking between realistic LLM-based agents, and design challenges, including the interpretation of LLM outputs by the agent model. By exploring prompt design opportunistically rather than systematically, we enhance the realism of agent interactions without exhaustive overfitting or model reliance. Our approach successfully replicates trade-to-order volume ratios observed in related asset markets, demonstrating the potential of LLM-augmented ABMs in financial simulations

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

A natural intuition about the economics of AI agents is that, because agents can be replicated at very low marginal cost, agent labor may be supplied highly elastically, placing downward pressure on cognitive-labor wages when it closely substitutes for human labor. We argue this framing is wrong in mechanism but partially correct in conclusion, and that the correction matters for both theory and policy. Agents are not labor; they are a production technology that converts compute capital K_c into effective units of cognitive labor L_A. Once this is recognized, the elastic-supply margin that anchors the equilibrium wage migrates from the labor market to the compute capital market. Building on the classic factor-pricing framework mankiw2020, we derive a Compute-Anchored Wage (CAW) bound stating that, on tasks where human and agent-produced cognitive labor are substitutes, the competitive human wage is bounded above by λcdot k cdot r_c, where r_c is the rental rate of compute capital, k is the compute intensity of one effective agent-produced cognitive labor unit, and λ is the relative human-to-agent productivity. We generalize the result through constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation, separate substitutable from complementary tasks, and discuss factor-share consequences. The conclusion is concise: the price-setter for cognitive labor is no longer the labor market.

When are multi-agent LLM systems merely a collection of individual agents versus an integrated collective with higher-order structure? We introduce an information-theoretic framework to test -- in a purely data-driven way -- whether multi-agent systems show signs of higher-order structure. This information decomposition lets us measure whether dynamical emergence is present in multi-agent LLM systems, localize it, and distinguish spurious temporal coupling from performance-relevant cross-agent synergy. We implement a practical criterion and an emergence capacity criterion operationalized as partial information decomposition of time-delayed mutual information (TDMI). We apply our framework to experiments using a simple guessing game without direct agent communication and minimal group-level feedback with three randomized interventions. Groups in the control condition exhibit strong temporal synergy but little coordinated alignment across agents. Assigning a persona to each agent introduces stable identity-linked differentiation. Combining personas with an instruction to ``think about what other agents might do'' shows identity-linked differentiation and goal-directed complementarity across agents. Taken together, our framework establishes that multi-agent LLM systems can be steered with prompt design from mere aggregates to higher-order collectives. Our results are robust across emergence measures and entropy estimators, and not explained by coordination-free baselines or temporal dynamics alone. Without attributing human-like cognition to the agents, the patterns of interaction we observe mirror well-established principles of collective intelligence in human groups: effective performance requires both alignment on shared objectives and complementary contributions across members.

In many real-world multi-agent cooperative tasks, due to high cost and risk, agents cannot continuously interact with the environment and collect experiences during learning, but have to learn from offline datasets. However, the transition dynamics in the dataset of each agent can be much different from the ones induced by the learned policies of other agents in execution, creating large errors in value estimates. Consequently, agents learn uncoordinated low-performing policies. In this paper, we propose a framework for offline decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning, which exploits value deviation and transition normalization to deliberately modify the transition probabilities. Value deviation optimistically increases the transition probabilities of high-value next states, and transition normalization normalizes the transition probabilities of next states. They together enable agents to learn high-performing and coordinated policies. Theoretically, we prove the convergence of Q-learning under the altered non-stationary transition dynamics. Empirically, we show that the framework can be easily built on many existing offline reinforcement learning algorithms and achieve substantial improvement in a variety of multi-agent tasks.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

In this paper we develop a model of an order-driven market where traders set bids and asks and post market or limit orders according to exogenously fixed rules. Agents are assumed to have three components to the expectation of future asset returns, namely-fundamentalist, chartist and noise trader. Furthermore agents differ in the characteristics describing these components, such as time horizon, risk aversion and the weights given to the various components. The model developed here extends a great deal of earlier literature in that the order submissions of agents are determined by utility maximisation, rather than the mechanical unit order size that is commonly assumed. In this way the order flow is better related to the ongoing evolution of the market. For the given market structure we analyze the impact of the three components of the trading strategies on the statistical properties of prices and order flows and observe that it is the chartist strategy that is mainly responsible of the fat tails and clustering in the artificial price data generated by the model. The paper provides further evidence that large price changes are likely to be generated by the presence of large gaps in the book.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

As autonomous systems move from prototypes to real deployments, the ability of multiple agents to make decentralized, cooperative decisions becomes a core requirement. This paper examines how agentic artificial intelligence, agents that act independently, adaptively and proactively can improve task allocation and coordination in multi-agent systems, with primary emphasis on drone delivery and secondary relevance to warehouse automation. We formulate the problem in a cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning setting and implement a lightweight multi-agent Proximal Policy Optimization, called IPPO, approach in PyTorch under a centralized-training, decentralized-execution paradigm. Experiments are conducted in PettingZoo environment, where multiple homogeneous drones or agents must self-organize to cover distinct targets without explicit communication.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Dynamic pricing in retail requires policies that adapt to shifting demand while coordinating decisions across related products. We present a systematic empirical study of multi-agent reinforcement learning for retail price optimization, comparing a strong MAPPO baseline with a graph-attention-augmented variant (MAPPO+GAT) that leverages learned interactions among products. Using a simulated pricing environment derived from real transaction data, we evaluate profit, stability across random seeds, fairness across products, and training efficiency under a standardized evaluation protocol. The results indicate that MAPPO provides a robust and reproducible foundation for portfolio-level price control, and that MAPPO+GAT further enhances performance by sharing information over the product graph without inducing excessive price volatility. These results indicate that graph-integrated MARL provides a more scalable and stable solution than independent learners for dynamic retail pricing, offering practical advantages in multi-product decision-making.

As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.

In this paper, we investigate learning temporal abstractions in cooperative multi-agent systems, using the options framework (Sutton et al, 1999). First, we address the planning problem for the decentralized POMDP represented by the multi-agent system, by introducing a common information approach. We use the notion of common beliefs and broadcasting to solve an equivalent centralized POMDP problem. Then, we propose the Distributed Option Critic (DOC) algorithm, which uses centralized option evaluation and decentralized intra-option improvement. We theoretically analyze the asymptotic convergence of DOC and build a new multi-agent environment to demonstrate its validity. Our experiments empirically show that DOC performs competitively against baselines and scales with the number of agents.

We argue that multi-agent test-time evolution is not single-agent evolution replicated N times. A single-agent learner can only evolve its own context and memory. A multi-agent system additionally evolves who collaborates, how they collaborate, and how knowledge flows across the population. These components have no single-agent counterpart and can produce phenomena such as emergent specialization. Yet prior test-time methods either confine experiences to individual agents, forfeiting cross-agent learning, or broadcast symmetrically to all agents, erasing the specialization that makes collaboration valuable. We present EVOCHAMBER, a training-free framework that instantiates test-time evolution at three levels over a coevolving agent pool. At its core is CODREAM (Collaborative Dreaming), a post-task protocol triggered on team failure or disagreement, in which agents collaboratively reflect, distill insights, and route them asymmetrically from strong to weak agents on the failed niche, preserving specialization while filling knowledge gaps. Team-level operators assemble niche-conditioned teams and select collaboration structures online. Population-level lifecycle operators fork, merge, prune, and seed agents under performance pressure. On three heterogeneous task streams with Qwen3-8B, EVOCHAMBER reaches 63.9% on competition math, 75.7% on code, and 87.1% on multi-domain reasoning, outperforming the best baseline by 32% relative on math and confirming asymmetric cross-agent transfer as the primary driver in ablation. Starting from several identically initialized agents, four to five stable niche specialists spontaneously emerge, a structural signature of multi-agent evolution that no single-agent learner can express. See our code at: https://github.com/Mercury7353/EvoChamber

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena{GitHub}.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

Simulating societies of many large language model (LLM) agents is expensive, yet the questions asked of such simulations are usually macroscopic: phase behaviour, stylised facts, and scaling with the number of agents N, not the cognition of any single agent. We turn a statistical-physics observation into a method: replace each LLM agent by a low-parameter model fitted from a few hundred to a few thousand cheap queries, then run the society at any N on a laptop. Whether this works is decided before the simulation runs, chiefly by what each agent perceives. We introduce an [interaction order x memory] taxonomy that maps perception and memory to an effective theory and a predicted N-trend of the surrogate error. We validate it on a faithful reimplementation of the LLM macroeconomy EconAgent and seven further named LLM simulations, with agent decisions cloned from genuine LLM elicitations (primarily DeepSeek) for a few dollars; the predicted error trends hold cell by cell, and the two refuted predictions, both on a strongly saturating response and traced to its curvature, are themselves matched quantitatively by the theory with no free parameters.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models are typically organized around roles, pipelines, and turn schedules, while the content that agents pass to one another is often left as unconstrained natural language. However, this free-form communication can rapidly inflate token usage, consume the shared context window, and ultimately affect both system performance and inference cost. We analyze five common inter-agent communication strategies across two MAS topologies, finding that no fixed strategy is universally optimal. Instead, effective inter-agent messages consistently preserve action-centered information needed by downstream agents. Building on this, we propose the PACT (Protocolized Action-state Communication and Transmission), which treats inter-agent communication as a public state-update problem and projects each raw agent output into a compact action-state record before it enters shared history. Across different MAS topologies, PACT consistently improves the performance-cost trade-off, achieving comparable or stronger task performance with substantially fewer tokens. The gains extend to production coding harnesses: PACT lifts OpenHands' resolve rate at -10% tokens-per-resolved, and is resolve-neutral on SWE-agent while halving input tokens. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/iNLP-Lab/PACT.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Pioneering advancements in large language model-powered agents have underscored the design pattern of multi-agent collaboration, demonstrating that collective intelligence can surpass the capabilities of each individual. Inspired by the neural scaling law, which posits that increasing neurons leads to emergent abilities, this study investigates whether a similar principle applies to increasing agents in multi-agent collaboration. Technically, we propose multi-agent collaboration networks (MacNet), which utilize directed acyclic graphs to organize agents and streamline their interactive reasoning via topological ordering, with solutions derived from their dialogues. Extensive experiments show that MacNet consistently outperforms baseline models, enabling effective agent collaboration across various network topologies and supporting cooperation among more than a thousand agents. Notably, we observed a small-world collaboration phenomenon, where topologies resembling small-world properties achieved superior performance. Additionally, we identified a collaborative scaling law, indicating that normalized solution quality follows a logistic growth pattern as scaling agents, with collaborative emergence occurring much earlier than previously observed instances of neural emergence. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/OpenBMB/ChatDev.

Tackling real-world socio-economic challenges requires designing and testing economic policies. However, this is hard in practice, due to a lack of appropriate (micro-level) economic data and limited opportunity to experiment. In this work, we train social planners that discover tax policies in dynamic economies that can effectively trade-off economic equality and productivity. We propose a two-level deep reinforcement learning approach to learn dynamic tax policies, based on economic simulations in which both agents and a government learn and adapt. Our data-driven approach does not make use of economic modeling assumptions, and learns from observational data alone. We make four main contributions. First, we present an economic simulation environment that features competitive pressures and market dynamics. We validate the simulation by showing that baseline tax systems perform in a way that is consistent with economic theory, including in regard to learned agent behaviors and specializations. Second, we show that AI-driven tax policies improve the trade-off between equality and productivity by 16% over baseline policies, including the prominent Saez tax framework. Third, we showcase several emergent features: AI-driven tax policies are qualitatively different from baselines, setting a higher top tax rate and higher net subsidies for low incomes. Moreover, AI-driven tax policies perform strongly in the face of emergent tax-gaming strategies learned by AI agents. Lastly, AI-driven tax policies are also effective when used in experiments with human participants. In experiments conducted on MTurk, an AI tax policy provides an equality-productivity trade-off that is similar to that provided by the Saez framework along with higher inverse-income weighted social welfare.

This paper explores existing works of multi-agent systems and identifies challenges that remain inadequately addressed. By leveraging the diverse capabilities and roles of individual agents within a multi-agent system, these systems can tackle complex tasks through collaboration. We discuss optimizing task allocation, fostering robust reasoning through iterative debates, managing complex and layered context information, and enhancing memory management to support the intricate interactions within multi-agent systems. We also explore the potential application of multi-agent systems in blockchain systems to shed light on their future development and application in real-world distributed systems.

Unsupervised skill discovery drives intelligent agents to explore the unknown environment without task-specific reward signal, and the agents acquire various skills which may be useful when the agents adapt to new tasks. In this paper, we propose "Multi-agent Skill Discovery"(MASD), a method for discovering skills for coordination patterns of multiple agents. The proposed method aims to maximize the mutual information between a latent code Z representing skills and the combination of the states of all agents. Meanwhile it suppresses the empowerment of Z on the state of any single agent by adversarial training. In another word, it sets an information bottleneck to avoid empowerment degeneracy. First we show the emergence of various skills on the level of coordination in a general particle multi-agent environment. Second, we reveal that the "bottleneck" prevents skills from collapsing to a single agent and enhances the diversity of learned skills. Finally, we show the pretrained policies have better performance on supervised RL tasks.

Can AI Agents simulate real-world trading environments to investigate the impact of external factors on stock trading activities (e.g., macroeconomics, policy changes, company fundamentals, and global events)? These factors, which frequently influence trading behaviors, are critical elements in the quest for maximizing investors' profits. Our work attempts to solve this problem through large language model based agents. We have developed a multi-agent AI system called StockAgent, driven by LLMs, designed to simulate investors' trading behaviors in response to the real stock market. The StockAgent allows users to evaluate the impact of different external factors on investor trading and to analyze trading behavior and profitability effects. Additionally, StockAgent avoids the test set leakage issue present in existing trading simulation systems based on AI Agents. Specifically, it prevents the model from leveraging prior knowledge it may have acquired related to the test data. We evaluate different LLMs under the framework of StockAgent in a stock trading environment that closely resembles real-world conditions. The experimental results demonstrate the impact of key external factors on stock market trading, including trading behavior and stock price fluctuation rules. This research explores the study of agents' free trading gaps in the context of no prior knowledge related to market data. The patterns identified through StockAgent simulations provide valuable insights for LLM-based investment advice and stock recommendation. The code is available at https://github.com/MingyuJ666/Stockagent.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

The evolution of cooperation has been extensively studied using abstract mathematical models and simulations. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and the rise of LLM agents have demonstrated their ability to perform social reasoning, thus providing an opportunity to test the emergence of norms in more realistic agent-based simulations with human-like reasoning using natural language. In this research, we investigate whether the cooperation dynamics presented in Boyd and Richerson's model persist in a more realistic simulation of the Diner's Dilemma using LLM agents compared to the abstract mathematical nature in the work of Boyd and Richerson. Our findings indicate that agents follow the strategies defined in the Boyd and Richerson model, and explicit punishment mechanisms drive norm emergence, reinforcing cooperative behaviour even when the agent strategy configuration varies. Our results suggest that LLM-based Multi-Agent System simulations, in fact, can replicate the evolution of cooperation predicted by the traditional mathematical models. Moreover, our simulations extend beyond the mathematical models by integrating natural language-driven reasoning and a pairwise imitation method for strategy adoption, making them a more realistic testbed for cooperative behaviour in MASs.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

Large sequence model (SM) such as GPT series and BERT has displayed outstanding performance and generalization capabilities on vision, language, and recently reinforcement learning tasks. A natural follow-up question is how to abstract multi-agent decision making into an SM problem and benefit from the prosperous development of SMs. In this paper, we introduce a novel architecture named Multi-Agent Transformer (MAT) that effectively casts cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) into SM problems wherein the task is to map agents' observation sequence to agents' optimal action sequence. Our goal is to build the bridge between MARL and SMs so that the modeling power of modern sequence models can be unleashed for MARL. Central to our MAT is an encoder-decoder architecture which leverages the multi-agent advantage decomposition theorem to transform the joint policy search problem into a sequential decision making process; this renders only linear time complexity for multi-agent problems and, most importantly, endows MAT with monotonic performance improvement guarantee. Unlike prior arts such as Decision Transformer fit only pre-collected offline data, MAT is trained by online trials and errors from the environment in an on-policy fashion. To validate MAT, we conduct extensive experiments on StarCraftII, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, Dexterous Hands Manipulation, and Google Research Football benchmarks. Results demonstrate that MAT achieves superior performance and data efficiency compared to strong baselines including MAPPO and HAPPO. Furthermore, we demonstrate that MAT is an excellent few-short learner on unseen tasks regardless of changes in the number of agents. See our project page at https://sites.google.com/view/multi-agent-transformer.