Daily Papers

Collective intelligence can emerge when individuals coordinate through a shared environment, allowing local actions to accumulate into durable social organization. Language-model agents offer a new substrate for this process, yet most multi-agent systems rely on direct conversation, predefined roles, or centralized workflows. It remains unclear whether decentralized agents can build functional technologies and outperform independent search. Here, initially homogeneous LLM agents in SwarmWorld self-organize without assigned roles or recipes into evolving technological societies. Agents explore a spatial environment, process resources, test materials, construct persistent artifacts, and write executable controllers evaluated by a deterministic simulator under unseen disturbances after the agents are removed. SwarmWorld splits cognition from consequence: agents propose architectures and controllers within fixed action and material schemas, while the simulated world determines function. Shared societies develop broader, more resilient technological portfolios than a strong best-of-N isolated-search baseline, although isolated search remains competitive for the strongest artifact. Agents differentiate into exploration, construction, maintenance, and coordination behaviors, transitioning as the world matures. Technologies accumulate through collaborative construction, executable inheritance, and persistent agent-artifact networks, with most reuse beginning through physical observation rather than communication. Explicit cultural mechanisms amplify collaboration and organization, but functional benefits depend on outcome and timescale. Physical stigmergy alone supports capable societies, while interaction drives persistent technological ecologies rather than universally superior individual inventions.

This paper explores the important role of critical science, and in particular of post-colonial and decolonial theories, in understanding and shaping the ongoing advances in artificial intelligence. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is viewed as amongst the technological advances that will reshape modern societies and their relations. Whilst the design and deployment of systems that continually adapt holds the promise of far-reaching positive change, they simultaneously pose significant risks, especially to already vulnerable peoples. Values and power are central to this discussion. Decolonial theories use historical hindsight to explain patterns of power that shape our intellectual, political, economic, and social world. By embedding a decolonial critical approach within its technical practice, AI communities can develop foresight and tactics that can better align research and technology development with established ethical principles, centring vulnerable peoples who continue to bear the brunt of negative impacts of innovation and scientific progress. We highlight problematic applications that are instances of coloniality, and using a decolonial lens, submit three tactics that can form a decolonial field of artificial intelligence: creating a critical technical practice of AI, seeking reverse tutelage and reverse pedagogies, and the renewal of affective and political communities. The years ahead will usher in a wave of new scientific breakthroughs and technologies driven by AI research, making it incumbent upon AI communities to strengthen the social contract through ethical foresight and the multiplicity of intellectual perspectives available to us; ultimately supporting future technologies that enable greater well-being, with the goal of beneficence and justice for all.

Metarobotics aims to combine next generation wireless communication, multi-sense immersion, and collective intelligence to provide a pervasive, itinerant, and non-invasive access and interaction with distant robotized applications. Industry and society are expected to benefit from these functionalities. For instance, robot programmers will no longer travel worldwide to plan and test robot motions, even collaboratively. Instead, they will have a personalized access to robots and their environments from anywhere, thus spending more time with family and friends. Students enrolled in robotics courses will be taught under authentic industrial conditions in real-time. This paper describes objectives of Metarobotics in society, industry, and in-between. It identifies and surveys technologies likely to enable their completion and provides an architecture to put forward the interplay of key components of Metarobotics. Potentials for self-determination, self-efficacy, and work-life-flexibility in robotics-related applications in Society 5.0, Industry 4.0, and Industry 5.0 are outlined.

Artificial intelligence promises to accelerate scientific discovery, yet its benefits remain unevenly distributed. While technical obstacles such as scarce data, fragmented standards, and unequal access to computation are significant, we argue that the primary barriers are social and institutional. Narratives that defer progress to speculative "AI scientists," the undervaluing of data and infrastructure contributions, misaligned incentives, and gaps between domain experts and machine learning researchers all constrain impact. We highlight four interconnected challenges: community dysfunction, research priorities misaligned with upstream needs, data fragmentation, and infrastructure inequities. We argue that their roots lie in cultural and organizational practices. Addressing them requires not only technical innovation but also intentional community-building, cross-disciplinary education, shared benchmarks, and accessible infrastructure. We call for reframing AI for science as a collective social project, where sustainable collaboration and equitable participation are treated as prerequisites for technical progress.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are rapidly becoming more capable, autonomous, and deeply embedded in social life. As humans increasingly interact, cooperate, and compete with AI, we move from purely human societies to hybrid human-AI societies whose collective dynamics cannot be captured by existing behavioural models alone. Drawing on evolutionary game theory, cultural evolution, and Large Language Models (LLMs) powered simulations, we argue that these developments open a new research agenda for social physics centred on the co-evolution of humans and machines. We outline six key research directions. First, modelling the evolutionary dynamics of social behaviours (e.g. cooperation, fairness, trust) in hybrid human-AI populations. Second, understanding machine culture: how AI systems generate, mediate, and select cultural traits. Third, analysing the co-evolution of language and behaviour when LLMs frame and participate in decisions. Fourth, studying the evolution of AI delegation: how responsibilities and control are negotiated between humans and machines. Fifth, formalising and comparing the distinct epistemic pipelines that generate human and AI behaviour. Sixth, modelling the co-evolution of AI development and regulation in a strategic ecosystem of firms, users, and institutions. Together, these directions define a programme for using social physics to anticipate and steer the societal impact of advanced AI.

AI's transformative impact on work, education, and everyday life makes it as much a political artifact as a technological one. Current AI models are opaque, centralized, and overly generic. The algorithmic automation they provide threatens human agency and democratic values in both workplaces and daily life. To confront such challenges, we turn to Scandinavian Participatory Design (PD), which was devised in the 1970s to face a similar threat from mechanical automation. In the PD tradition, technology is seen not just as an artifact, but as a locus of democracy. Drawing from this tradition, we propose Participatory AI as a PD approach to human-centered AI that applies five PD principles to four design challenges for algorithmic automation. We use concrete case studies to illustrate how to treat AI models less as proprietary products and more as shared socio-technical systems that enhance rather than diminish human agency, human dignity, and human values.

Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such as driving on highways, scheduling meetings, and working collaboratively--to our global challenges--such as peace, commerce, and pandemic preparedness. Arguably, the success of the human species is rooted in our ability to cooperate. Since machines powered by artificial intelligence are playing an ever greater role in our lives, it will be important to equip them with the capabilities necessary to cooperate and to foster cooperation. We see an opportunity for the field of artificial intelligence to explicitly focus effort on this class of problems, which we term Cooperative AI. The objective of this research would be to study the many aspects of the problems of cooperation and to innovate in AI to contribute to solving these problems. Central goals include building machine agents with the capabilities needed for cooperation, building tools to foster cooperation in populations of (machine and/or human) agents, and otherwise conducting AI research for insight relevant to problems of cooperation. This research integrates ongoing work on multi-agent systems, game theory and social choice, human-machine interaction and alignment, natural-language processing, and the construction of social tools and platforms. However, Cooperative AI is not the union of these existing areas, but rather an independent bet about the productivity of specific kinds of conversations that involve these and other areas. We see opportunity to more explicitly focus on the problem of cooperation, to construct unified theory and vocabulary, and to build bridges with adjacent communities working on cooperation, including in the natural, social, and behavioural sciences.

Both Minsky's "society of mind" and Schmidhuber's "learning to think" inspire diverse societies of large multimodal neural networks (NNs) that solve problems by interviewing each other in a "mindstorm." Recent implementations of NN-based societies of minds consist of large language models (LLMs) and other NN-based experts communicating through a natural language interface. In doing so, they overcome the limitations of single LLMs, improving multimodal zero-shot reasoning. In these natural language-based societies of mind (NLSOMs), new agents -- all communicating through the same universal symbolic language -- are easily added in a modular fashion. To demonstrate the power of NLSOMs, we assemble and experiment with several of them (having up to 129 members), leveraging mindstorms in them to solve some practical AI tasks: visual question answering, image captioning, text-to-image synthesis, 3D generation, egocentric retrieval, embodied AI, and general language-based task solving. We view this as a starting point towards much larger NLSOMs with billions of agents-some of which may be humans. And with this emergence of great societies of heterogeneous minds, many new research questions have suddenly become paramount to the future of artificial intelligence. What should be the social structure of an NLSOM? What would be the (dis)advantages of having a monarchical rather than a democratic structure? How can principles of NN economies be used to maximize the total reward of a reinforcement learning NLSOM? In this work, we identify, discuss, and try to answer some of these questions.

This paper examines how competing sociotechnical imaginaries of artificial intelligence (AI) risk shape governance decisions and regulatory constraints. Drawing on concepts from science and technology studies, we analyse three dominant narrative groups: existential risk proponents, who emphasise catastrophic AGI scenarios; accelerationists, who portray AI as a transformative force to be unleashed; and critical AI scholars, who foreground present-day harms rooted in systemic inequality. Through an analysis of representative manifesto-style texts, we explore how these imaginaries differ across four dimensions: normative visions of the future, diagnoses of the present social order, views on science and technology, and perceived human agency in managing AI risks. Our findings reveal how these narratives embed distinct assumptions about risk and have the potential to progress into policy-making processes by narrowing the space for alternative governance approaches. We argue against speculative dogmatism and for moving beyond deterministic imaginaries toward regulatory strategies that are grounded in pragmatism.

Over the past half century, there have been several false dawns during which the "arrival" of world-changing artificial intelligence (AI) has been heralded. Tempting fate, the authors believe the age of AI has, indeed, finally arrived. Powerful image generators, such as DALL-E2 and Midjourney have suddenly allowed anyone with access the ability easily to create rich and complex art. In a similar vein, text generators, such as GPT3.5 (including ChatGPT) and BLOOM, allow users to compose detailed written descriptions of many topics of interest. And, it is even possible now for a person without extensive expertise in writing software to use AI to generate code capable of myriad applications. While AI will continue to evolve and improve, probably at a rapid rate, the current state of AI is already ushering in profound changes to many different sectors of society. Every new technology challenges the ability of humanity to govern it wisely. However, governance is usually viewed as both possible and necessary due to the disruption new technology often poses to social structures, industries, the environment, and other important human concerns. In this article, we offer an analysis of a range of interactions between AI and governance, with the hope that wise decisions may be made that maximize benefits and minimize costs. The article addresses two main aspects of this relationship: the governance of AI by humanity, and the governance of humanity by AI. The approach we have taken is itself informed by AI, as this article was written collaboratively by the authors and ChatGPT.

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena{GitHub}.

Artificial Intelligence (AI), like any transformative technology, has the potential to be a double-edged sword, leading either toward significant advancements or detrimental outcomes for society as a whole. As is often the case when it comes to widely-used technologies in market economies (e.g., cars and semiconductor chips), commercial interest tends to be the predominant guiding factor. The AI community is at risk of becoming polarized to either take a laissez-faire attitude toward AI development, or to call for government overregulation. Between these two poles we argue for the community of AI practitioners to consciously and proactively work for the common good. This paper offers a blueprint for a new type of innovation infrastructure including 18 concrete milestones to guide AI research in that direction. Our view is that we are still in the early days of practical AI, and focused efforts by practitioners, policymakers, and other stakeholders can still maximize the upsides of AI and minimize its downsides. We talked to luminaries such as recent Nobelist John Jumper on science, President Barack Obama on governance, former UN Ambassador and former National Security Advisor Susan Rice on security, philanthropist Eric Schmidt on several topics, and science fiction novelist Neal Stephenson on entertainment. This ongoing dialogue and collaborative effort has produced a comprehensive, realistic view of what the actual impact of AI could be, from a diverse assembly of thinkers with deep understanding of this technology and these domains. From these exchanges, five recurring guidelines emerged, which form the cornerstone of a framework for beginning to harness AI in service of the public good. They not only guide our efforts in discovery but also shape our approach to deploying this transformative technology responsibly and ethically.

As far-right actors increasingly exploit online platforms to disseminate ideology and mobilize supporters, civil society organizations (CSOs) play a vital yet underrecognized role in monitoring antidemocratic dynamics online. Unlike fact-checkers or content moderators, CSOs engage in long-term, contextualized analysis, often in resource-constrained settings and under precarious conditions. Despite their critical societal role, CSOs face significant barriers to adopting or co-developing technical solutions, including legal uncertainty, limited platform access, and chronic underfunding. Existing research and tool development efforts have largely overlooked these actors in favor of more institutionally embedded stakeholders. This paper addresses this gap through a qualitative study with 15 practitioners from 12 Germany-based CSOs engaged in online monitoring, positioning them as key yet overlooked stakeholders in the governance of digital spaces. We explore their current practices, challenges, and expectations regarding technological support. Our findings show that monitoring remains largely manual due to the lack of tailored tools, with enhanced search capabilities emerging as the most pressing technical need. While participants express openness to AI-supported features such as media processing and content discovery, many remain skeptical of automated classification, citing concerns around trust, legal usability, and professional credibility. Grounded in these findings, we introduce a conceptual monitoring workflow and describe its implementation in an open-source Telegram monitoring prototype designed to flexibly support diverse monitoring goals. We outline concrete design, policy, and research recommendatios, and introduce the manual labor trap as an empirically grounded concept that explains why monitoring CSOs tend to remain locked into labor-intensive, low-capacity arrangements.

The growing need for accountability of the people behind AI systems can be addressed by leveraging processes in three fields of study: ethics, law, and computer science. While these fields are often considered in isolation, they rely on complementary notions in their interpretation and implementation. In this work, we detail this interdependence and motivate the necessary role of collaborative governance tools in shaping a positive evolution of AI. We first contrast notions of compliance in the ethical, legal, and technical fields; we outline both their differences and where they complement each other, with a particular focus on the roles of ethical charters, licenses, and technical documentation in these interactions. We then focus on the role of values in articulating the synergies between the fields and outline specific mechanisms of interaction between them in practice. We identify how these mechanisms have played out in several open governance fora: an open collaborative workshop, a responsible licensing initiative, and a proposed regulatory framework. By leveraging complementary notions of compliance in these three domains, we can create a more comprehensive framework for governing AI systems that jointly takes into account their technical capabilities, their impact on society, and how technical specifications can inform relevant regulations. Our analysis thus underlines the necessity of joint consideration of the ethical, legal, and technical in AI ethics frameworks to be used on a larger scale to govern AI systems and how the thinking in each of these areas can inform the others.

The paradigm of pretrained deep learning models has recently emerged in artificial intelligence practice, allowing deployment in numerous societal settings with limited computational resources, but also embedding biases and enabling unintended negative uses. In this paper, we treat pretrained models as objects of study and discuss the ethical impacts of their sociological position. We discuss how pretrained models are developed and compared under the common task framework, but that this may make self-regulation inadequate. Further how pretrained models may have a performative effect on society that exacerbates biases. We then discuss how pretrained models move through actor networks as a kind of computationally immutable mobile, but that users also act as agents of technological change by reinterpreting them via fine-tuning and transfer. We further discuss how users may use pretrained models in malicious ways, drawing a novel connection between the responsible innovation and user-centered innovation literatures. We close by discussing how this sociological understanding of pretrained models can inform AI governance frameworks for fairness, accountability, and transparency.